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This thesis consists of three empirical essays within the broad field of labor 
economics. All three essays are self-contained and can be read independently 
of the others. They include: (a) Telecommunication Externality on Migration: 
Evidence from Chinese Villages; (b) Rusticated Youth: the Send-down 
Movement and Beliefs; and (c) Adolescent Adversity and Long-run Health. 
 
The first chapter examines the telecommunications externality on migration. It 
uses a unique experiment in Chinese villages to investigate whether access to 
telecommunications—in particular, landline phones—increases the likelihood 
of outmigration. By using regional and time variations in the installation of 
landline phones, the difference-in-difference estimation shows that the access 
to landline phones increases the ratio of out-migrant workers in China. It also 
confirms that landline phones affect outmigration through two channels: 
information access on job opportunities and timely contact with left-behind 
family members. 
 
The second chapter investigates whether a difficult environment in early life 
shape people's core beliefs and values. We examine the long-term impact of 
the send-down movement during China’s Cultural Revolution, when urban 
educated youths were forced out of cities to work and live in undesirable rural 
areas. The mandatory policy applied to urban youth who graduated from 
junior or senior high school between 1966 and 1976. We identify the send-
down effect by regression discontinuity, comparing individuals who graduated 
just before and just after the implementation of the policy. Using individual-
viii 
 
level survey data, we find that rusticated individuals value family and 
relationships more highly, are less likely to believe in luck as the most 
important factor for success, and support social equality more strongly.  
 
The last chapter exploits the effect of early life environment on long-run 
health outcomes. By using variation in the living conditions experienced by 
rusticated youths after being sent down to rural areas during China's Cultural 
Revolution, this paper finds that rusticated youths—who lived in a 
disadvantaged environment with poor sanitary and nutrition conditions for 
years—were more likely to develop chronic diseases and mental problems. 
We also find that these effects are similar across gender, but stronger for 
individuals with fewer siblings. We innovate by (1) linking a harsh 
environment in the teen years to individuals’ health conditions almost 40 years 
later, for a long-term follow-up, and (2) employing Regression Discontinuity 
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Chapter One  
Telecommunication Externality on Migration: Evidence 
from Chinese Villages 
1.1 Introduction 
The past decades have witnessed a surge in international and intranational 
migration. The United Nations (2010) documents that international migration 
increased from 145 million people to 191 million people during 1990–2005. In 
the past three decades in China, 500 million people have flocked to the city, 
and during 2000–2010 alone, China’s urban population expanded by 210 
million (Wong 2012). Outmigration is generally found to profoundly 
contribute to the welfare of both the recipient and sending destinations. In a 
literature survey, Clemens (2011) found that eliminating barriers to labor 
mobility can lead to a 67–147 percent increase in gross domestic product 
(GDP), while the corresponding numbers to eliminating all trade barriers and 
capital flow barriers are 0.3 to 4.1 percent and 0.1 to 1.7 percent, respectively. 
Meanwhile, a 10 percent increase in the remittance to the GDP ratio is found 
to reduce the poverty ratio (measured by the share of residents living on less 
than $1 a day) by 1.6 percent (Adam and Page 2005).
1
 Despite the significant 
economic benefits, however, there are still substantial barriers to labor 
mobility. According to the Gallup World Poll (2010),
2
 16 percent of the 
world’s adults, or 700 million adults, would like to migrate if given the 
                                                 
1 See Hanson (2010) for more discussion on the impact of emigration on sending countries.  
2 See Neil Esipova and Julie Ray, “700 Million Worldwide Desire to Migrate Permanently: 
U.S. Tops Desired Destination Countries,” http://www.gallup.com/poll/124028/700-Million- 
Worldwide-Desire-Migrate-Permanently.aspx (accessed June 16, 2014). 
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opportunity. Why do so many potential migrants fail to act out their wishes? 
How can we increase the likelihood of outmigration? 
The literature on the determinants of migration, starting from the classical 
Harris and Todaro (1970), emphasizes the rural-urban earning differentials as 
the key reason. Moreover, scholars recognize that a fundamental problem in 
migration is uncertainty. Potential migrants do not have full information about 
job opportunities, wages, and the quality of life in destination cities, and new 
evidence on migrants’ expectations in developing countries suggest how 
inaccurate these expectations can be (McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman 2013). 
The literature has recognized and provided evidences that an important way to 
reduce information problems is through the channel of networks (Barr and 
Oduro 2002; Hanson and McIntosh 2010; Kilic and others 2009; McKenzie 
and Rapoport 2010; Munshi 2003; Uhlig 2006; Winters, de Janvry, and 
Sadoulet 2001; Yamauchi and Tanabe 2008). The literature also suggests that 
fast-changing information technology and its associated exposure on urban life 
would change the quality of information received by potential migrants and, 
therefore, their migration decisions. For instance, individuals exposed to 
foreign media and social media are more likely to migrate (Braga 2007; 
Komito 2011). Access to mobile phones increases the probability and intensity 
of rural-urban migration by offering more information about the labor market 
at the destination (Aker, Clemens, and Ksoll 2011; Muto and Yamano 2009). 
Moreover, the impact of mobile phone coverage expansion on migration 
depends on personal networks: the expansion of a mobile phone network 
strengthens the effect of the existing ethnic network on migration (Muto and 
Yamano 2009; 2011). But better information does not uniformly encourage 
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migration—it depends on whether potential migrants over- or under-estimate 
the prospects of the potential destinations. If potential migrants over-estimate 
their employment and life prospects in the destination region, better access to 
information may decrease migration, as found by Farre and Fasani (2012). 
In this paper, we investigate whether the availability of information 
technology, in particular, the access to in landline phones, can loosen the 
constraints on potential migrants and lead to an increase in outmigration. How 
does telecommunications access affect outmigration? We consider two 
potential reasons. First, telecom technologies allow potential migrants to 
access external labor market information, which substantially reduces their 
searching costs and increases the accuracy of their costs-benefits analysis of 
migration decisions. Second, telecom access allows migrants convenient and 
timely contacts with their left-behind family members, which substantially 
reduces the psychological costs of migration. This is especially important in 
China because of the prevailing policies regarding access to education and 
health care those discriminate against migrants, which results in adults largely 
leaving their families and migrating alone (Wong 2012). 
Using the data of the National Fixed Point Survey conducted by the 
Ministry of Agriculture of China in 1993 and 1995–2000, we exploit regional 
and time variations in the installation of landline phones to identify the causal 
effect of landline phones on outmigration. Out of 61 villages in our sample, 35 
had landline phones in 1993 (i.e., our initial year), 23 installed landline phones 
at different times during the sample period, and 3 remained without access to 
landline phones by 2000. Meanwhile, other telecom technologies, such as 
mobile phones and the Internet, only started to penetrate in the late 1990s and 
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mostly in rich and coastal cities. Hence, our research setting allows us to 
separate the effect of landline phones from other competing telecom 
technologies. Furthermore, our identification is aided by directly controlling 
for the exposure to other information sources, such as newspapers and 
televisions. An important advantage of relying on landline phones to identify 
the effects of telecom technology is that we face a less serious challenge of 
endogeneity. Individuals can purchase mobile phones, and the access to 
mobile phones is closely related to personal ability, wealth, and demand for 
modern technology, which may be strongly related to the migration decision. 
In contrast, the installation of landline phones at the village level, as we 
document later, was largely related to several easily observable variables, and 
thus, its endogeneity for migration can be more easily dealt with. Perhaps 
because of this reason, our estimates of the telecom effects on migration are 
quite stable. 
Based on the difference-in-difference (DID) approach, we find that the 
installation of landline phones leads to an increase in the ratio of out-province 
migrant workers in total rural labor force by 1.5-2.1 percentage points, or 
39-54 percent of the sample mean. The results are robust to a battery of 
validity checks, such as using DID coupled with matching, using 
county-average gradient as IV for landline phone installation, controlling for 
pretreatment effect, and using a flexible estimation method to account for 
differences in the time trend in outmigration of treatment and control groups. 
Two placebo tests also confirm our identification assumptions. First, if the 
telecom effect merely reflects the time trend in relatively rich villages, then 
villages always with telecom access should have higher migration trends, but 
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we find a similar trend in the migration levels for villages always with telecom 
access and those never with telecom access. Second, if the telecom effects on 
outmigration reflect effects other than the information or timely contact with 
left-behind families (as we hypothesize), telecom access will likely affect 
out-village, within-county migration, but we do not find that telecom access 
affects such short-distance migration. 
We further test our two proposed mechanisms through which landline 
phones may increase outmigration, that is, information access and timely 
contact with left-behind family members. We find that the positive effect of 
landline phones on outmigration is greater for villages with a larger pool of 
previous out-migrants (a proxy for the information access through the network 
effect) and for villages with more young children (a proxy for left-behind 
family members). 
Our paper is complementary to the existing literature on the determinants 
of migration in several ways. First, by using unique data on landline phone 
installation and by taking advantage of the predictive nature of landline phone 
installation at the village level, we have a relatively transparent and plausible 
strategy for identifying the effects of telecom on migration. The robustness of 
the results under a variety of specification checks testifies the plausibility of 
our identification strategy. Second, our evidence comes from the country that 
has experienced the largest migration in the world during which migration was 
in full swing, and it is useful to know whether modern telecom would have 
quantitatively important impact on migration. We find it is so. Third, there is 
little evidence of how family structure and psychological costs of migration 
affect migration, and in this paper, our results suggest that modern telecom 
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may reduce the psychological costs of migration by allowing migrants to stay 
in touch with their children left behind in the villages. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the 
rural-to-urban migration and the development of landline phones in China. In 
Section 3, we lay out the theoretical model. Section 4 presents the empirical 




1.2.1 Rural-to-Urban Migration in China 
Because of food shortage and the great famine after the collapse of the Great 
Leap Forward in the early 1960s, the Chinese government started to restrict 
inter-region migration, especially rural-to-urban migration, to ensure that 
sufficient resources stayed in agriculture production and to contain pressure 
for job creation in the cities. Specifically, the government adopted a household 
registration system (hukou in Chinese), which delineates where a person can 
live and what social welfare programs he or she is entitled to (e.g., Wu 1994; 
Zhao 2000). Without an urban residence permit (urban hukou), a farmer could 
not live and work in the city. It became nearly impossible for farmers to obtain 
urban hukou after the early 1960s (Naughton 2007). From 1949 to 1985, the 
average rural-to-urban migration rate for China was only 0.24, compared with 
a world average of 1.84 from 1950 to 1990 (Zhao 2000). 
Since 1978, China has embarked on a great economic and social 
transformation, which has subsequently led to substantial changes in the 
rural-urban divide. In rural China, the household responsibility system 
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emerged and eventually replaced the previous commune system, which greatly 
improved agricultural efficiency and generated surplus labor (Lin 1992; Zhao 
2004). In urban areas, the development of a market-oriented economy, the 
establishment of special economic zones, the expansion of the non-state 
sector, and the loosening of the urban employment policy created strong 
demand for migrant labor (Cai 2001; Meng and Zhang 2001). In addition, 
decades of rural-urban segregation and uneven economic growth led to a large 
income gap between urban and rural areas, which provided a stimulus for 
people to migrate to coastal and eastern China (Bao and others 2011). All 
these developments have contributed to China’s surge in internal 
rural-to-urban migration. 
According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, rural out-migrant 
workers are defined as individuals who have rural household registration 
status but left their homeland and have worked outside the towns and counties 
for at least 6 months. As shown in Figure 1.1, the number of rural out-migrant 
workers rose from around 20 million in 1990 to 62 million in 1993, 132 
million in 2000, and nearly 160 million in 2011.
3
 Most of these migrant 
workers, constrained by their lower education levels, work in the 
manufacturing and construction sectors in cities. However, rural-to-urban 
migration has significantly benefited both recipient and sending areas. For 
example, the Pearl Delta and Yangtze River Delta regions have emerged as 
one of the most important global manufacturing bases since the 1990s, partly 
because of the constant supply of cheap rural labor (Huang and Zhan 2005). 
And the large amount of remittances has greatly contributed to the economic 
                                                 
3
 Some other estimates are greater. For instance, Wong (2012) suggests that China’s urban 
population expanded by 210 million. 
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development of inland rural areas through both consumption and investment 
and has helped reduce rural poverty since the late 1990s (de Brauw and 
Rozelle 2008). 
[Insert Figure 1.1 Here] 
Unlike many other international or internal migrations, rural-to-urban 
migration in China has its own features. Because of the presence of the 
household registration system, rural migrants find it difficult to permanently 
settle down in recipient cities for a long time.
4
 Also, they are largely denied 
access to many of the social welfare programs, such as education and 
medicine, to which their urban counterparts are entitled. Indeed, typically, 
migrant workers on average return home two to three times annually and 
spend less than 9 months in recipient cities (Zhao 1999). Another important 
feature of rural-to-urban migration in China is the emergence of the 
village-based migrant network. Because of decades of separation, rural 
households have limited ties with urban communities and little access to 
institutional supports at the destinations, making them rely on their 
origin-based networks to find jobs (e.g., Solinger 1999; Zhao 2003). This is 
also common in many other developing countries (Barr and Oduro 2002; 
Munshi 2003; Uhlig 2006; Winters, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 2001; Yamauchi 
and Tanabe 2008). Meng (2000) shows that 70 percent of rural-to-urban 
migrants in China found their jobs through the village-based friends or 
relatives. Before the arrival of modern telecommunications technologies, such 
as landline and mobile phones, potential migrants had to wait for temporary 
                                                 
4 This issue has changed substantially in the past few years. It has become easier for migrants 
to settle down in small cities, though the access to vital social services remains disadvantaged 
for migrants relative to residents with local urban hukou. 
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returns of previous migrants (such as during the Spring Festival) to obtain 
labor market information in cities, which generated substantial delays and high 
search costs. 
 
1.2.2 Development of Landline Phones in China 
When the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, the country 
had only 300,000 telephones, or 0.05 sets per 100 people. In addition, telecom 
facilities were largely outdated and concentrated in just a few large cities, such 
as Chongqing, Shanghai, and Wuhan (Wauschkuhn 2001). From 1949 to 
China’s economic reform initiated in 1978, the government gave priority to 
developing heavy industry and largely neglected investment in 
telecommunications. As a result, the number of telephones grew very slowly 
relative to the growth in population: the tele-density in 1978 was only 0.38 
sets per 100 people (see Figure 1.1). 
In the late 1980s, economic reforms led to rapid growth in the economy. 
The booming economy started to call for better communications services, the 
shortage of which clearly became a key bottleneck for further development. 
Thus, in the seventh five-year plan in 1985, the State Council, or the cabinet, 
stated that telecom development would become a national priority and the 
focus was to develop telecom facilities in major cities and coastal areas. 
Meanwhile, the government allowed telecom companies to borrow from 
state-owned banks and foreign sources and to enjoy preferential tax rates. As a 
result, the number of landline phones started to rise, growing at an average 
annual rate of 17 percent between 1986 and 1990 (Clegg, Kamall, and Leung 
1996). However, the incentive schemes and federal support systems were only 
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given to some specific areas (i.e., 14 open coastal cities and 5 special 
economic zones), which amplified the telecom advantage of the key cities 
against the rural areas. By 1991, these specific areas accounted for nearly 25 
percent of telecom networks in China (Wu 2008), and almost all subscribers 
were living in urban areas while people in remote rural parts of China 
remained unconnected. 
For a long time before the late 1990s, the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications was the regulator and main operator of telecom services, 
and telecom monopoly seriously constrained the development of the industry. 
In the late 1990s, partly following the worldwide trend (Li and Xu 2004), 
China started telecom deregulation and liberalization by granting more 
administrative autonomy to the Post and Telecommunications Bureaus at the 
regional and local levels, by introducing more competitors to market, and by 
gradually opening the telecom markets to foreign investors. As a result, 
service quality has dramatically improved and tariffs have fallen substantially, 
leading to a record growth in landline phone subscribers.
5
 As shown in Figure 
1.1, the number of landline phones per 100 people increased from less than 1 
in 1990 to more than 12 in 2000, and the number continued to rise to 28.1 by 
2006. Meanwhile, with the introduction of new technologies, other telecom 
modes, such as cellular phones and the Internet, began to penetrate China. For 
example, the number of cellular phone users surpassed the number of landline 
phone users in 2003 and peaked at 75 sets per 100 people by 2011. The 
number of Internet users has increased nearly 7 times between 2002 and 2011. 
However, between 1993 and 2000 (our sample period), landline phones were 
                                                 
5 Using cross-country data, Li and Xu (2004) find that both telecom privatization and 
competition facilitated telecom development, especially when both are done at the same time. 
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the primary telecom tool, especially in rural areas. The exclusive reliance on 
landline phones in the rural areas thus allows us to focus on a single telecom 
technology. Moreover, because the introduction of a landline phone network 
was largely determined by village characteristics, as we will demonstrate later, 
we should be able to identify the effects more convincingly than to identify the 
telecom effects of mobile phones, which involves individual- or 
household-level selectivity to a larger extent.   
 
1.3 Model 
In this section, we present a simple model to illustrate how landline phones 
may affect the likelihood of outmigration. While we emphasize two channels 
(the provision of external labor market information and timely communication 
with left-behind family members), we acknowledge that there could be other 
possible explanations. Here our purpose is to offer a simple framework to 
guide our empirical analysis. The model we use is based on the discrete choice 
framework proposed by Borjas (1987). 
Consider the decision faced by individual i  on whether to work in an 
outside city (migrate) or to stay in the village (stay). If she chooses to stay, her 
utility is assumed to be 
,sss wU          (1.1) 
where sw is the wage rate in the village and s is the idiosyncratic utility level 
for staying. If she chooses to migrate, her utility is assumed to be 
,),(),( mmmm HTgCwNTfU      (1.2) 
where mw  is the wage rate in the city; mC  captures the costs of migration, 
such as financial costs and so on. m is the idiosyncratic term for migrating.  
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The effect of landline phones is captured by the two functions, 
),( NTf  and ),( HTg . ),( NTf  measures the labor market information 
available to the individual, which is affected by the access to landline phones (
T ) and the information network (measured by the existing number of migrant 
workers in the same village, N ). It is assumed that 0Tf , 0Nf , and
0TNf , that is, the access to landline phones not only increases the 
availability of labor market information but also magnifies the effect of 
networking. The assumption on the interaction term is plausible since the same 
network effect is realized much faster and much more cheaply when village 
residents have access than without access to the phone network (Barr and 
Oduro 2002; Hanson and McIntosh 2010, McKenzie and Rapoport 2010; Kilic 
and others 2009; Munshi 2003; Uhlig 2006; Winters, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 
2001; Yamauchi and Tanabe 2008). The second function, ),( HTg , measures 
the psychological costs faced by a migrant worker, which include those 
associated with leaving family members behind. The number is assumed to 
decrease with access to a landline phone (T ) and increase with the number of 
left-behind family members, such as children ( H ). In addition, the availability 
of landline phones should reduce the negative impact of the number of 
left-behind family members. Thus, 0Tg , 0Hg , and 0THg . The 
assumption of a negative interaction term is based on the intuition that talking 
and advising over the phone to the left-behind family members in the village 
allow the migrant to ease the pains of not seeing the family and help the 
migrant to react more quickly in cases of emergency. 




























    (1.3) 
                   
where mssm  
~ ; (.)I is the indicator function; and (.)J  and (.)j are the 
cumulative and probability distribution function of sm
~ , respectively. 
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With the properties of (.)f and (.)g , we obtain three propositions. 
Proposition 1: The effect of landline phones on the probability of 






Proposition 2: The positive effect of landline phones on outmigration is 








Proposition 3: The positive effect of landline phones on outmigration is 









1.4 Empirical Strategy 
We rely on the DID approach to identify the causal effect of access to landline 
phones on outmigration. Our baseline estimation equation is as follows:  
,vtvttvvt Teley                  (1.4) 
where vty  is the ratio of out-province migrant workers to the total labor force 
in village v at year t. vtTele  
is equal to 1 if village v had landline phones at 
year t and 0 if not. v  is the village fixed effect, capturing all time-invariant 
village heterogeneity, such as the distance away from coastal regions, culture, 
village inequality, and so on. t  is the year fixed effect, capturing all yearly 
shocks common to all villages, such as the business cycle, macro level 
regulations, and the trend in income growth. vt  is the error term. To deal 
with the potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, we cluster the 
standard error at the village level to avoid overstating estimation precision 
(Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). 
Note that in our data, there are three types of villages: (1) some had 
landline phones through the whole sample period (referred to as incumbents); 
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(2) some had no landline phones through the whole sample period (referred to 
as outsiders); and (3) some installed landline phones during the sample period 
at different time points (referred to as switchers). The staggered nature of 
landline installation provides us with additional identifying variations. In the 
baseline DID estimation, we first use the whole sample and hence our DID 
identification essentially comes from a comparison of the early installing 
switchers with the later installing switchers, incumbents and outsiders. 
Second, we focus on the switchers that are assumed to be more homogeneous, 
and the identification relies on the comparison of the early installing switchers 
with the later installing ones.
6
 As one of the robustness checks, given that 
there is no status change in the incumbents and outsiders, the comparison 
between these two groups provides us with a good placebo test, i.e., for two 
comparison groups without treatment, their differences in the outcome should 
be stable over time. 
Specifically, the identifying assumption associated with the DID 
estimation equation (1.4) is that, conditional on the controls, our regressor of 
interest (i.e., the interaction between the treatment status indicator and 
post-treatment period indicator) is uncorrelated with the error term. That is,  
   .,|,,| tvvttvvtvt ETeleE                   (1.5) 
In the remaining part of this section, we discuss potential violations of our 
identifying assumption and our remedies, as well as several robustness checks. 
 
1.4.1 Placement and Timing of Landline Phone Installation 
                                                 
6 Note that there are only 23 villages in this robustness check analysis. Hence, to adjust the 
inference issue of few clusters, we use the Wild cluster-bootstrap percentile-t procedure 
developed by Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008). 
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A potential challenge to the DID estimation specification is that the place and 
timing of the installation of landline phones are not random. For example, 
more remote and poorer villages could install landline phones later than 
coastal and richer villages. One may then be concerned that such preexisting 
differences across treatment and control groups may explain the 
post-treatment divergence in the ratio of out-migrant workers, causing a 
spurious correlation between our regressor of interest and the outcome 
variable. Thus, one must understand what determines which village installed 
landline phones earlier to isolate the effect of landline phones on outmigration. 
To this end, we first conducted an intensive online research on how 
China Telecom Corporation, the monopoly of telecommunications in the 
1990s and early 2000s, decided which village to be connected to the landline 
phone network first in the 1990s.
7
 Unfortunately, there is not much discussion 
online about the determinants of landline phone connection. Among the 
sporadic pieces of information we found, most websites cite income level as 
the main reason. We then interviewed one China Telecom Corporation 
employee to get first-hand information about landline phone installation. We 
were told that when choosing which village was connected to the landline 
phone network first, the company mainly considered the degree of facility use, 
which is closely related to village’s level of economic development. 
We next conduct a regressional analysis on the determinants of 
landline phone connection based on the aforementioned anecdotal evidences. 
Specifically, we first consider the village’s level of economic development, 
that is, average income per capita and total population. We then consider 
                                                 
7 The search engine we used is Baidu, the Chinese version of Google and the best in 
searching Chinese websites. 
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special government policies, that is, whether the village was officially 
classified as a poverty village and whether it was officially classified as a 
disadvantaged village
8—both categories of villages are supposed to enjoy 
compensatory treatment over many policies. We also consider geographic 
features (that may affect the costs of installing landline phones), that is, the 
percentage of arable land, whether the village was in the mountainous area, the 
distance to the nearest county or municipal (or prefecture) government, and 
the distance to the main road. Lastly, we investigate whether the installation 
was triggered by the needs of out-migrant workers, and thus consider both the 
existing and potential out-migrant workers. We use the ratio of out-county 
migrant workers in 1991 to measure the existing out-migrant workers, and use 
percentage of idle labors as a proxy for potential migrant workers, use 
percentage of remittance income and percentage of credit income as proxies 
for migration constrains. All these determinant variables were measured in the 
pretreatment stage in 1991. 
The regressions results are reported in Table 1.1. Columns [1] to [4] 
deal with the placement of landline phones, and the dependent variable is 
whether a village installed landline phones in 1993. Columns [5] to [8] 
concern the timing of the installation, and the dependent variable is the 
number of years from the initial year (i.e., 1993) of the sample until the year 
that the village installed landline phones. We also experimented with the Cox 
proportional hazards model; the qualitative results are similar.
9
 
[Insert Table 1.1 Here] 
                                                 
8 Disadvantaged areas are regions that are occupied with vulnerable groups and minorities and 
far from economic center. 
9 The results are available upon request.  
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The findings are consistent with our anecdotal evidence about the key 
importance of local income level. Indeed, richer villages are more likely to 
have landline phones in 1993 (columns [1] to [4]) and more likely to install 
landline phones earlier (columns [5] to [8]). Average income per capita and 
total population together can explain around 23-30 percent of the total 
variations in the placement and timing of landline phone installation. 
Meanwhile, villages classified as “poor villages” or “disadvantaged villages” 
and closer to the nearest county or municipal (or prefecture) government were 
more likely to have landline phones in 1993 and more likely to install landline 
phones earlier, while villages located in mountainous areas were less likely to 
have landline phones in 1993 and more likely to install landline phones later. 
None of the remaining determinants are statistically significant. In particular, 
the ratio of out-migrant workers in 1991 and proxies for potential migrant 
workers are consistently insignificant, suggesting that the installation of 
landline phones is not reversely caused by our outcome variable. 
In summary, our evidences in this subsection, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, show that the average income of a village, the population in a 
village, the “poor village” status, the “disadvantaged village” status, the 
distance to the nearest county or municipal (or prefecture) government, and 
the topographic conditions are important factors in determining whether the 
village installed landline phones and its timing. Meanwhile, conditional on 
these key determinants, other factors are found to be not statistically 
significant, especially the pretreatment ratio of outmigration villagers. 
Although 54 percent of the differences between treatment and control groups 
remain unexplained, it is really hard to locate other factors that significantly 
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drive both the selection of landline phone installation and the post-installation 
differential in migration between these two groups. 
 
1.4.2 Augmented Estimation Specification and Robustness Checks 
We have established that the treatment and control groups ex ante differ 
significantly in village’s level of economic development. To alleviate the 
concern that preexisting differences in economic development between the 
treatment and control groups may generate the differential patterns of 
outmigration over time, we follow Gentzkow (2006) in controlling for a 
flexible time trend in outmigration generated by the preexisting village 
characteristics. Specifically, we interact a second-order polynomial function of 
time with the village’s average income per capita in 1991, total population (in 
logarithm form) in 1991, the “poor village” status in 1991, the “disadvantaged 
village” status in 1991, the indicator of being in mountainous area, and the 
distance to the nearest county or municipal (or prefecture) government.
10
 
Moreover, we also control for some other village characteristics and the 
exposure of other media which may affect out-migration, including number of 
firms, percentage of non-labor force, sex ratio, percentage of electrified 
households in the village, number of newspapers and magazines subscribed 
per household, and number of TV sets per households. However, worrying 
that these control variables may be affected by the installation of landline 
phones, we use the values of these controls in 1993 and interact them with the 
                                                 
10
 We also use distance to the nearest county or municipal government as a proxy to control 
for other infrastructure (such as roads/trains) and commuting time, since migrant workers live 
closer to county or municipal government will more easily be able to travel between work and 
home location. Moreover, using fourth-order polynomial function of time in the interactions 
generates very similar results. 
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second-order polynomial function of time. Nonetheless, using interactions 
with forth-order polynomial function of time or the time-varying values of 
these control variables generate similar results.
11
 
Hence, our augmented DID estimation specification becomes 
,' vtvtvttvvt Teley   X             (1.6) 
where vtX  is a vector of additional controls discussed earlier. The new 
identifying assumption is 
   tvvtvttvvtvtvt ETeleE  ,,|,,,| XX  .       (1.7) 
 
1.5 Data and Variables 
The data come from the National Fixed Point Survey conducted by the 
Ministry of Agriculture of China in 1986–1991, 1993, and 1995–2000.12 
Because surveys in 1986–1991 do not contain information on landline phones, 
we restrict our analysis to the 1993 and 1995–2000 surveys. The survey sites 
were randomly sampled from six provinces (i.e, Gansu, Guangdong, Hubei, 
Liaoning, Shandong, and Yunnan provinces). As shown in Figure 1.2, the 
sample provinces (in red) are spread out across China, ranging from coastal to 
inland areas and covering northern, southern, western and eastern China; they 
also feature diverse levels of economic development, climate, natural 
endowment, and infrastructure. 
[Insert Figure 1.2 Here] 
We have a total of 67 villages in 1993. Six villages were deleted 
because they changed location codes over time, for which we cannot trace. 
Among the remaining 61 villages, 35 villages had landline phones in 1993 
                                                 
11 The results are available upon request. 
12 Surveys were not conducted in 1992 and 1994 because of financial reasons.  
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(incumbent villages); 23 villages installed landline phones during the sample 
period (switching villages); and 3 villages had no landline phones installed 
even at the end of our sample period (outsider villages). 
The key variables for our analysis are the measure of out-province 
migrant workers as dependent variable, and an indicator of installation of 
landline phones as a regressor of interest. In National Fixed Point Survey, 
labors or workers is defined as males with ages 16-60 and females with ages 
16-55, which is the official one used by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China. In the survey, a labor is classified as the migrant worker if the 
individual has worked outside the village (including out-village and 
within-county, out-county and within-province, out-province and within-China, 
and overseas) for most of the time of a year.
 13
 Table 1.2 reports the summary 
statistics of our key variables. During the sample period (1993, 1995–2000), 
the overall ratio of out-province migrant workers to total labor force is 3.9 
percent, and the overall ratio of out-village, within-county migrant workers is 
5.2 percent. Meanwhile, our sample villages are quite poor with an average 
annual income per capita of 2076 yuan or US$333, small (i.e., 479 households 
living in a 7 square kilometer area), and mostly located out of the mountains 
(i.e., 68 percent). 
[Insert Table 1.2 Here] 
Note that the distances among 61 sample villages are quite large, 
averaging 835 kilometers between any two villages. Such long distances make 
                                                 
13 In China, the administrative hierarchy in the rural areas is central government, followed by 
provincial government, municipal government, county government, and then village 
government. There are 32 provinces, 345 municipalities, 2,856 counties, and 4,044,907 
villages in April 2013.  
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We present summary statistics of landline phone accessibility in Table 
1.3. The number of villages with landline phones in our data increased from 
35 in 1993 to 58 in 2000 (panel A). Except for Gansu province, all villages in 
the other provinces in our data had access to landline phones by the end of 
2000 (panel B). Finally, the timing of installing landline phones varies across 
our sample villages and time (panel C). For example, most landline phones in 
Hubei province were installed in the early years of our sample period (i.e., 
1993, 1995–1996), while installation occurred much late in Gansu province 
(i.e., 1998–2000). Such variations afford us a good opportunity to identify the 
causal effect of landline phones by using the DID estimation method.  
[Insert Table 1.3 Here] 
 
1.6 Empirical findings 
1.6.1 Main Results 
Figure 1.3 shows the difference in the ratio of out-migrant workers between 
treatment and control groups over time. Clearly, the treatment and control 
groups have similar ratios of out-migrant workers 2 years and 1 year before 
the installation of landline phones in treatment villages. Right after the 
installation of landline phones, treatment villages experience an increase in the 
ratio of out-migrant workers, and the trend continues for at least 2 more years. 
                                                 
14 It is possible that non-sampled villages in between might also be treated, and there might be 
spillover effects from non-sampled treatment villages to our control villages. In this case, our 
estimation gives us the lower bound of the land-line phone effects. 
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Regression results using the DID specification (i.e., equation [6]) are 
reported in Table 1.4. We start with including only year and village fixed 
effects in column [1] of the upper panel. Here, landline phones have a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient, which is consistent with the findings in 
Figure 1.3. This result suggests that access to landline phones increases the 
ratio of outmigration by 2 percentage points. 
[Insert Figure 1.3 Here] 
[Insert Table 1.4 Here] 
In columns [2]-[3], we progressively add second-order time 
polynomial function of time interacted with village characteristics in 
1991/1993 to control for the possible differences among villages. Village 
characteristics include average income per capita in 1991, total population (in 
logarithm form) in 1991, the “poor village” status in 1991, the “disadvantaged 
village” status in 1991, the indicator of being in mountains area, the distance 
to the nearest county or municipal (or prefecture) government, the number of 
firms in 1993, the percentage of non-labor force in 1993, the sex ratio in 1993, 
the percentage of electrified households in the village in 1993, the number of 
newspapers and magazines subscribed per household in 1993, and number of 
TV sets per households in 1993. Evidently, our estimated coefficients of 
landline phones not only remain statistically significant but also have similar 
magnitude—now the landline phone effect on migration ratio is 2.1 percentage 
points, or about 54 percent of the mean (i.e., 3.9 percent). 
While in the lower panel of Table 1.4, we focus on the switchers group 
(those villages installed landline phones during our sample period), which are 
presumably more homogenous. To address the issue of a small number of 
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clusters, we calculate the standard errors using the Wild cluster-bootstrap 
percentile-t procedure developed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008). 
The installation of landline phones is still found to positively and statistically 
significantly affect the out-migration, with a slightly decline in the magnitude. 
The landline phone effect on migration ratio is 1.8 percentage points, or about 
46 percent of the sample mean. 
 
1.6.2 Robustness Checks 
In this subsection, we conduct several robustness checks on our identifying 
assumption (equation [1.7]). Regression results are reported in Table 1.5. 
[Insert Table 1.5 Here] 
One potential challenge to our DID estimation is that even with a long 
list of controls (i.e., province-year dummies, village dummies, various 
time-varying village characteristics, and so on), there may remain some 
unobserved time-varying village characteristics that drive both the installation 
of landline phones and changes in the ratio of out-migrant workers. Such local 
characteristics would include local government officials’ attitude toward 
outmigration, variation in hukou access across villages in rural China, or the 
village’s evolving policies on land reallocation when local residents migrate. 
Although variables such as these are likely to change gradually over time 
rather than suddenly or all at once, their effects are likely to appear as if 
changes in outmigration would anticipate the installation of landline phones 
(Jensen and Oster 2009). This is similar to the preprogram test in labor 
economics (Heckman and Hotz 1989), and the significance of the “landline 
phone anticipator” likely indicates that the landline phone effect merely 
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reflects the influence of related confounding factors. To check the possibility 
of such confounding effects, we include an indicator for installing landline 
phones next year in the regression. As shown in column [1] of Table 1.5, the 
“effect” of installing landline phones next year is statistically insignificant, 
and our main coefficient remains robust to this control, supporting the validity 
of our DID estimation. 
Second, we use a more flexible specification for installing landline 
phones in the future and past, that is, replacing our regressor of interest ( vtTele
) with a series of time dummies indicating various distance in time to the 
landline installation year (the default time category is at least three years 
before the installation). Such an exercise can shed light on whether the 
treatment and control groups are comparable until the time of treatment and 
become different after that time. As shown in column [2] of Table 1.5, we find 
similar patterns in outmigration between treatment and control groups before 
the installation of landline phones, but they diverge right after the installation, 
with much larger magnitudes. Furthermore, we test whether the post year 
coefficients are different from pre year ones, the F statistic for the joint test is 
2.92, we can reject the null hypothesis that all the post-treatment coefficients 
are equal to the pre-treatment coefficients at 5 percent level, and thus further 
support our argument. 
 
1.6.3 Two Placebo Tests 
We now conduct two placebo tests to offer further support to our key results. 
First, in the survey, we have three villages that had not installed landline 
phones by the end of the sample period (i.e., 2000). If outmigration is truly 
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triggered by landline phones, we should see a similar trend in the ratio of 
out-migrant workers between villages with landline phones and those without 
landline phones throughout the entire sample period, because their landline 
phone status did not change over time. In other words, for two comparison 
groups without treatment, their differences in the outcome should be stable 
over time. Indeed, Figure 1.4 shows that the differences between the two 
comparison groups, despite some fluctuations, remain similar over our sample 
period.  
[Insert Figure 1.4 Here] 
Second, in our theory, the effect of landline phones on outmigration 
originates from the sharing of job information and timely contact with 
left-behind family members. Because villages within the same county are 
quite close, these two roles of landline phones may not be important, and we 
should expect that landline phones have no impact on migration to different 
villages or towns within the same county. To test this implication, we 
construct a new outcome variable, With-county, which is the percentage of 
out-village, within-county migrant workers (in total village labor force), and 
we re-estimate equation (6) using this outcome variable (see column [3] of 
Table 1.5). Evidently, there is no statistically significant effect of landline 
phones on out-village, within-county migration. 
 
 
1.6.4 Using IV Estimation 
Even after controlling for significant determinants of landline phone 
placement and a long list of village characteristics, however, we may still face 
26 
 
biases arising from the selection on unobservables. To overcome these 
challenges to identification, we follow the recent literature on network-rollouts 
or infrastructure rollouts that use geographical variations as instrumental 
variable (e.g. Klonner and Nolen 2008; Duflo and Pande 2007; Farre and 
Fasani 2012). Specially, we instrument for landline phone placement using 
average gradient. The rationale for this instrument is that installation costs of 
landline phones may differ by gradient;
 15
 for example, flatter areas tend to 
have lower installation costs and are more likely to install landline phones 
earlier. The following equation estimates the ﬁrst-stage effects of average 
gradient on landline phone installation: 
.')( vtvttvtvvt postgradientTele   X    (1.8) 
Where tpost is the indicator of post-treatment period, which is equal to 1 
if      
 , and    
  is the year in which the treatment village v installed 
landline phones and 0 otherwise. The second-stage regression is as follows: 
.')( vtvtvttvvt TeleY   X                  (1.9) 
The IV estimation result is shown in column [4] of Table 1.5, and we still find 
that installation of landline phone raises the out-province migration 
significantly, by 1.5 percentage points.  
 
 
1.6.5 Using DID Matching 
                                                 
15
 We use average gradient of each county as a proxy for the village’s 
topographic condition, as none of our sample villages is located within the 
same county. The average gradient for each county are calculated based on the 
GIS data on China. 
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To ensure that our results are not driven by functional form assumptions, we 
use an alternative estimation method. That is, we use the propensity score 
matching method to locate an ex ante similar control village for each of our 
treatment villages, and then we conduct a DID estimation based on these 
matched data. Specifically, matching is conducted based on the average 
income per capita, total population, whether being classified as 
“disadvantaged village”, whether being in mountainous area, the distance to 
the nearest county or municipal (or prefecture) government, number of firms 
in the village, the percentage of non-labor force, the sex ratio in the village, 
the percentage of electrified households, the number of newspapers and 
magazines subscribed per household, and number of TV sets per households 
from the initial year of the sample until the village installed landline phones. 
For the treatment villages that installed landline phones in each sample year 
between 1995 and 2000, we conduct one-to-one propensity score matching to 
locate a similar control village from a group of villages that had landline 
phones before that year. As shown in column [5] of Table 1.5, we find similar 
results for the landline phone effect using this matched sample. 
 
1.6.6 Mechanism 
We now check for the two mechanisms through which landline phones affects 
outmigration, that is, the provision of information on outside job opportunities 
and timely contact with left-behind family members. For the first channel to 
work, we expect the effect of landline phones to be stronger for villages 
having a larger stock of pretreatment out-migrant workers (a proxy for the 
information access through the network effect). For the second channel to 
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work, we expect the effect of landline phones to be stronger for villages 
having a larger number of young children (a proxy for left-behind family 
members).  
Regression results are reported in Table 1.6. In column [1], we add the 
interaction term between landline phone and ratio of out-province migrant 
workers in previous year, the coefficient is positive and significant, suggesting 
that the effects of landline phones on the ratio of out-migrant workers are 
larger for villages with more previous out-migrant workers. In column [2] of 
Table 1.6, we add the interaction of landline phone and the percentage of 
children aged 7 to 13. Consistent with our argument, we find that the effects of 
landline phones on the ratio of out-migrant workers are larger for villages with 
more young children. In column [3], we include both interactions in the same 
regression and conduct a “horse race” between the two channels in order to 
access the relative strength of each channel. As shown in the table, a one 
standard deviation increase in the ratio of previous out-migrant workers would 
lead to a 0.39 standard deviation increase in the effect of landline phones on 
out-province migration ratio; and increasing the ratio of children in the 
previous year by one standard deviation would boost the effect of landline 
phones on out-province migration ratio by 0.11 standard deviation. Thus, the 
results render strong support to our conjectures that landline phone availability 
facilitates migration by reducing information costs on job searches and 
lessening psychological costs of leaving families behind, and the strength of 
the first channel is relatively larger. 





Using a unique natural experiment in which the installation of landline phones 
in a village was easily explained by obvious village factors with the added 
advantage of no other telecommunications options available to confound our 
analysis, we rely on the DID approach to identify the effect of access to 
landline phones on outmigration. We find that the effect is substantial, 
increasing the probability of outmigration by roughly 54 percent (or 2.1 
percentage points). The results are robust to alternative controls and an 
alternative estimation approach. Our various specification checks, such as 
placebo tests, pretreatment tests, and so on, also render support to our 
identifying assumptions based on the DID approach. Perhaps more 
convincingly, we find that the landline phone effects are achieved mainly 
through two channels: by reducing job search costs (as we find the effect is 
stronger when the village had a large migrant network in the pretreatment 
period) and by timely contacting left-behind families (as we find the effect to 
be stronger in villages with more children). 
Our paper implies that modern communication technology has a large 
role to play in facilitating labor mobility between rural and urban sectors, and 
thus adds to recent literature that provides empirical evidence on the critical 
importance of modern telecom on economic development.
16
 Since labor 
movement from low- to high-productivity sectors is a primary avenue for 
economic growth (e.g., Ngai and Pissarides 2007; Robinson 1971), the 
government should take into account the positive externality of having modern 
                                                 
16 Harrison, Lin and Xu (forthcoming) provide evidence that modern telecom is of key 
importance for explaining cross-country firm-level performance around the world, and 




telecom technology installed in rural areas. Such externality is unlikely to be 
taken into account when telecom is monopolized by specific ministries, as in 
the case of China—in this case the ministry is likely to consider only the 
economic benefits of installing additional landline phones (or mobile towers) 
for the ministry or the telecom operators. Indeed, in our specification checks, 
we find that the decision to install a landline phone network only depended on 
local income level, but not the previous migrant network. Because our 
findings suggest that the benefits of a telecom network would be higher in 
areas with a larger migrant network and more children, it is perhaps important 
for telecom providers to internalize the extra benefits for providing 

















Rusticated Youth: the Send-down Movement and Beliefs 
2.1 Introduction 
Core beliefs and values play important roles in decision-making and economic 
development. Various pieces of empirical evidence have been interpreted to 
suggest the relevance of beliefs to economic outcomes; for example, top 
managers’ corporate strategies (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Hambrick and 
Brandon 1988; Schwartz 2010); international bilateral trade among countries 
(Guiso et al. 2009); taxation and redistribution systems (Giuliano and 
Spilimbergo 2014); and economic growth (Barro and McCleary 2003). 
Despite their crucial role in shaping economic and political outcomes, little 
empirical work has examined how values are formed and evolve over time. 
Are beliefs and values exogenous? Or is it possible that socio-economic 
shocks experienced over the life cycle lead to adaptation of beliefs? 
In this paper, we estimate the effect of difficult experiences in early 
life on individuals’ values and beliefs. Social psychology suggests that basic 
values develop and mature during a period of great mental 
plasticity—generally viewed as the teen years and early adulthood —then 
change very little over time (Krosnick and Alwin 1989). Thus, difficult life 
events and experiences during an individual’s early life should have a 
significant and persistent impact on one’s values and behavior. Empirically, 
direct investigation of the relationship between experience and beliefs suffers 
from endogeneity issues. For example, people who undergo certain 
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experiences or live in a particular environment may have many unobservable 
attributes that affect their preferences and economic outcomes. 
To overcome this identification problem, we explore the impact of a 
mandatory policy on urban-to-rural migration in China. In December 1968, the 
then-leader of China, Mao Zedong, initiated a national movement of sending 
eligible urban youths (junior and senior high school students) to rural areas. 
By the end of the policy in the late 1970s, more than 17 million people were 
rusticated (Pan 2002). The sent-down youths were uprooted from their 
families and lives in the cities and forced to work and live in the countryside. 
The experience was generally believed to be dramatic and traumatic for the 
affected youths; they lived with peasants and did hard manual labor every day, 
and were not allowed to visit family for several years. While there is broad 
agreement on the social cost of the send-down movement, only a few studies 
have empirically explored the impact on the sent-down individuals(e.g., Meng 
and Gregory 2002; Li et al. 2010), and even fewer have considered the effect 
on their core values. 
This sudden and unexpected mandate in 1968 applied to all eligible 
urban individuals who would graduate from junior or senior high school 
between 1968 and 1976, which equips us with a regression discontinuity (RD) 
design to estimate the impact of the send-down experience on individuals’ 
values. Specifically, the RD estimator compares individuals graduating just 
before (i.e., birth cohort 1946) with those just after (i.e., birth cohort 1947) the 
policy was implemented. Practically, we focus on a window of seven cohorts 
on each side of the cutoff cohort (birth cohort 1947), and compute the RD 
estimate by running a piece-wise polynomial estimation (see Section 2.2.3 for 
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details of the estimation particulars). A potential concern is that individuals 
born just before and just after 1947 could differ for reasons unrelated to the 
send-down experience. Therefore, it is important to use another group, to 
whom the policy did not apply, as a comparison. To this end, we use the rural 
sample to estimate the difference in values between rural individuals born 
before and after 1947 (to whom the policy did not apply), and subtract it from 
the estimate of the effect of being born after 1947 that we got from the urban 
data—a combined RD and difference-in-difference (RD-DD) estimator. 
We show that individuals graduating just before and just after the 
send-down policy are similar in family background and personal attributes. 
Meanwhile, the density distributions of birth year and birth month are similar 
for birth cohort 1946 and cohort 1947, suggesting no manipulation or sorting 
across the two groups. However, the sent-down cohort (post-1947 cohorts) 
presents systematically different values. Compared to the non-sent-down 
individuals, they: (1) value family and relationships more highly; (2) 
appreciate monetary success less; (3) are less likely to believe luck as the most 
important factor for success, and that connections are more important than 
personal ability; and (4) tend to oppose economic growth at the expense of 
social inequality. Our findings are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks (see 
Section 2.4.5 for details). Meanwhile, we examine the presence of 
heterogeneous effects, i.e., gender, number of siblings, ethnicity, and family 
background. Overall, we find that the effect of being sent-down is quite 
general, with slightly stronger effects for ethnic minorities and for individuals 
with less educated parents or fewer siblings. There are no significant 
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differences in the send-down effect across gender or the family’s political 
identity. 
We believe that the most plausible interpretation is that the send-down 
movement affected the youths in their impressionable years. According to 
social psychology, this is a critical period of time during which core values 
form, develop, and mature—thus shaping individuals’ values in a profound 
and persistent manner. The experience of being forced to leave family and 
home may have affected their attitudes toward family and relationships, and 
the hard manual labor and rural environment changed their beliefs about 
success and social equality. As a support to our argument, we find that the 
send-down effects are stronger for people who went to rural counties with 
more stringent living standards (measured as the ratio of destination counties’ 
disposable income over source cities’).  Meanwhile, we check the relevance 
of several alternative explanations, in addition to our preferred argument of 
difficult life experiences during childhood. Specifically, we find that the 
differences in values between send-down-eligible and non-eligible individuals 
are not due to the disruption in educational attainment, a violent environment 
(i.e., urban violence during Cultural Revolution), or different motivations in 
answering surveys. 
Our paper brings together two strands of growing literature. Empirical 
evidence for the effect of environment on preferences and beliefs is thin; the 
only exceptions are Malmendier and Nagel (2011), Alesina and 
Fuchs-Schundeln (2007), Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014), who examine the 
effect of macroeconomic shocks on preference for risks, government 
intervention, and redistribution, respectively. In line with these studies, we 
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find that a difficult environment, both economically and socially, has a 
significant impact on the formation of core values. The literature on early life 
environment is more extensive, and examines its influence on both early 
childhood well-being and later life outcomes (Heckman 2000, Currie (2001, 
Currie and Thomas 2001, Krueger and Whitmore 2001, Garces et al. 2002, 
Gould et al. 2011 and Carneiro et al. 2010). Our findings on the formation of 
core values are not only of direct importance, but also provide a possible 
channel through which early interventions can shape later life decisions and 
outcomes, such as education attainment, labor supply, and marriage. 
Other research has examined the impact of send-down on individuals’ 
later life outcomes. Li et al. (2010) uses twin data and find that rusticated 
individuals did not have worse—and, in some cases, had better—outcomes for 
health, earnings, career, and social status. Meng and Gregory (2002) and Zhou 
(2013) find sent-down individuals were more likely to upgrade education after 
returning to the city. Our paper examines the impact on people’s core values, 
which in turn may affect their later life decisions. More importantly, our 
design—comparing cohorts just before and just after the enforcement—is very 
close to a natural experiment, and our estimates are not limited to youths of a 
particular background or family structure. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly 
describes the send- down movement in China and outlines estimation strategy. 
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 reports the main findings and the 
estimates of the send-down effect, as well as several robustness checks. 
Section 5 discusses possible interpretations of our findings and the relevance 
of other competing hypothesis. Section 6 concludes. 
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2.2 Estimation Strategy 
2.2.1 The Send-down Movement 
The “Up to the Mountain and Down to the Countryside Movement” 
(send-down) in China was the massive movement of educated youths who 
were forced to leave their urban homes to live and work in rural areas. 
Beginning in the 1950s, as a policy response to urban employment problems, 
it evolved into a political movement during the Cultural Revolution and 
affected millions of urban youths until its end in 1978. 
A small scale movement started in the early 1950s, following Mao’s 
rallying cry to develop remote regions. In 1955, Mao commented that “the 
countryside is a vast expanse of heaven and earth where we can flourish,” 
which was an attempt to direct the urban unemployed to rural areas. The early 
phase of the send-down movement was mostly voluntary. 
With the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, schools across the 
country closed, leaving most teenagers idle.  Many became “Red Guards”, 
the mission of which was to harass and attack counter-revolutionaries and 
intellectuals with capitalist leanings, in an effort to make education conform to 
socialism (Bridgman 1967; Heaslet 1972). Soon, the Red Guards had become 
a destructive force. They harassed ordinary citizens, raided homes, destroyed 
schools and factories, and engaged in robbery and other criminal behavior. 
On December 22, 1968, Mao asserted that “The intellectual youth must 
go to the countryside, and will be educated from living in rural poverty,” and 
called for a nationwide mandatory movement of urban youth to the 
countryside. Party leaders believed that send- down could defuse the Red 
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Guards and the chaos they were creating, and at the same time solve the urban 
unemployment problem and increase agricultural productivity. Mao’s 1968 
directive marked the official beginning of the mandatory and large-scale 
send-down. 
The policy came as an unanticipated shock to the people. It forced all 
eligible youths out of the cities and exiled them to the countryside and remote 
regions. The policy applied to individuals who: (1) were registered as urban 
residents (holding an urban hukou) and (2) had just graduated from junior or 
senior high school.  As schools had been shut down nationally since 1966, 
three classes of graduates (1966-1968) were sent down together in 1968. 
Individuals who had a rural hukou, or those who had attained education lower 
than middle school, were not subject to the scheme. From 1968 to 1978, 
around 17 million people, or 10.5% of the non-farming population at that time, 
were sent down to rural areas (Pan 2002). 
Even though some were inspired by the revolutionary and patriotic 
propaganda, most youths did not want to be separated from their families and 
give up the better life and work opportunities in urban areas. Many families 
with eligible youth were forced, under political pressure, to cooperate; parents 
were often threatened with job loss. As one sent-down individual recounted 
his experience: 
I was only 15 when I was sent down. No one wanted to go, but no one 
could resist. When I refused to go, those in charge of the residential committee 
came to our home every day and asked us to study Chairman Mao’s 
instructions. A member of the worker’s propaganda team came to live in our 
home and organized a study team for my family. My father was a cadre. He 
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was locked up in a study team in his workplace and was not allowed to return 
home until his children agreed to go to the rural area. In the end, my mother 
begged me to go to the rural area. (Deng, 1993, p.60) 
The government relaxed enforcement after 1977 and brought some 
youths back to work in the urban labor force or enter college. By 1979, Mao’s 
successors had denounced the send-down policy and allowed all the affected 
youths to return to their home regions. 
 
2.2.2 Framework 
The send-down movement in China moved millions of teenagers from urban 
to rural areas and significantly altered their childhoods (see Section 2.5.1 for 
more discussion on lives in rural areas). We exploit this event to examine the 
effect of childhood experience on values and beliefs. Specifically, we use the 
regression discontinuity (RD) framework, which is arguably the closest in the 
observational data analysis to the experimental design (e.g., Lee and Lemieux 
2010). 
As an illustration of the RD framework, consider the following Rubin 
causal model: Let     be the outcome (i.e., measures of values and beliefs; see 
Section 2.3 for details) of individual   being sent down to the countryside and 
    be the outcome in the absence of send-down, and denote    as the status 
of send-down, i.e., 1 if individual    was sent down and 0 otherwise. The 
effect of send-down is identified as 
   [       ]                 
 However, as we cannot observe for individual   both his/her    and    , 
the comparison of outcomes between the sent-down group (i.e.,   =1) and the 
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non-sent-down group (i.e.,   =0) could be biased due to the selection issue, 
i.e.,  [        ]   [        ]  The sudden, mandatory send-down 
movement in 1968 implies that the probability of being sent down is 
discontinuous at a cutoff point    of the birth cohort (ci), i.e., 
        [     ]          [     ]. Assuming  [        ] is continuous in 
  at   , Hahn et al. (2001) show that   can be identified as  
   
    
 
 [       ]     
    
 
 [       ]
   
    
 
 [       ]     
    
 
 [       ]
  ̂                  
As only urban cohorts were affected by the 1968 send-down movement, 
we compute the above RD estimator using the urban sample. 
A potential concern about the above RD estimator is that it may also 
capture the cohort effect—that is, people born in different years are inherently 
different. In other words,  ̂   becomes          , where         is the 
cohort effect. To address this concern, we include data on rural individuals 
who were ineligible for the send-down movement, and then combine the RD 
framework with a difference-in-differences (DD) analysis, i.e.,  ̂         
       ,  ̂                   and hence  ̂       ̂        
 ̂          .  
 
2.2.3 Estimation Particulars 
In this subsection, we discuss some particulars of our RD and RD-DD 
estimations; specifically, the choice of cutoff cohort, estimation specifications, 
and the calculation of standard errors. 
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Birth cohort and cutoff point. The assignment variable in our 
RD/RD-DD estimation, birth cohort ( ), is essentially a grade-based birth 
cohort—that is, students born in different months but at the same grade. Since 
its establishment, China has followed the former Soviet Union and used 
September as the school opening month. Hence, in constructing our 
assignment variable, we define a birth cohort as those born between 
September (in the previous year) and August (in the current year). For 
example, cohort 1947 comprises students born between September 1946 and 
August 1947. 
The mandatory send-down movement was launched by Mao in December 
1968. The oldest cohort affected was those who graduated from senior high 
school in 1966. Meanwhile, the school starting age was 7 in the 1950s-1980s, 
and the completion of the primary grades and junior and senior high school 
took 6 years, 3 years, and 3 years, respectively.  Hence, the first cohort 
affected by the mandatory send-down policy is cohort 1947; accordingly, we 
set the cutoff point          
RD specification. Lee and Lemieux (2010) shows that the RD estimator 
(2.2) is essentially an instrumental variable estimator. Specifically, the first 
stage of the instrumental variable estimation has the following specification: 
      [     ]         [     ]                           
where  [ ] is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if the argument in 
the bracket is true and 0 if it is false. The second stage is 
               [     ]                           
where      and      are flexible functions of   , controlling for the direct 
effect of birth cohort on the outcome variables. 
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In carrying out the above RD estimation, we first use the sample of all 
urban junior high school or above graduates, as they were subject to the 
mandatory send-down movement. Second, we focus on a narrower window of 
seven cohorts on each side of the cutoff point (cohort 1947), which is 
rationalized by the balancing tests in the next subsection. Third, the unknown 
functions,      and       are proxied by the first-order polynomial function; 
Lee and Card (2008) points out that when the assignment variable (cohort in 
our case) is discrete, one cannot use the nonparametrical estimation, even with 
data of infinite observations. Lastly, standard errors are clustered at the cohort 
level, as suggested by Lee and Card (2008) for the case of a discrete 
assignment variable. 
RD-DD specification. To address the concern about cohort effect, we add 
into our RD estimation a sample of the rural population—who were not 
affected by the mandatory send-down movement in 1968—for a combined RD 
and DD estimation. Specifically, the first stage of the RD-DD estimation is 
                                                           
And the second stage is 
                                                  
where   represents an individual and c represents the cohort;         is a 
dummy variable indicating whether individual   from cohort c had urban 
hukou at the age of 12;    is the cohort fixed effects, absorbing the unknown 
functions      and     ; and      [                ]  is an 
indicator of cohorts subject to the mandatory send-down movement.
17
 
                                                 
17 As the send-down movement was officially terminated in 1978, the last cohort subject to 
the movement is then cohort 1961. 
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In carrying out the above RD-DD estimation, we first include the whole 
population of urban junior high school or above graduates and rural 
individuals to increase the sample size.
18
 Second, standard errors are clustered 
at the cohort level implied by Lee and Card (2008) for the RD framework and 
by Bertrand et al. (2004) for the DD framework. 
 
2.2.4 Potential Manipulation 
The key identifying assumption of our RD and RD-DD estimations is that 
 [        ] is continuous in c at   ; in other words, people cannot fully 
manipulate the assignment variable, i.e., the timing of births. 
Before discussing the validity of our identification strategy, let us first 
point out that our estimation framework allows for a certain degree of 
manipulation within cohorts; that is, within the send-down-eligible cohorts, 
the selection of being sent down is allowed. For in- stance, students with 
certain beliefs and values may have avoided being sent down by deliberately 
injuring themselves or failing to complete school, and our identification 
strategy allows for such selection. The rationale is similar to the case of 
randomized controlled trials (RCT) with some compliers and some 
non-compliers. For example, within the treatment group, people can choose to 
participate in the treatment (i.e., compliers) or not (non-compliers). But as 
long as there is randomization across the treatment and control groups, the 
comparison of outcomes between the whole treatment and the whole control 
groups can identify the intention-to-treat effect (ITT). Meanwhile, using the 
randomization to instrument for the real status of treatment can identify the 
                                                 
18 The results (available upon request) using the population of rural junior high school or 
above graduates as the control is qualitatively similar. 
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treatment-on-treated effect (TOT). In our analyses, we compute both ITT and 
TOT estimators. 
Several threads of anecdotal evidence suggest that our identifying 
assumption is satisfied. First, the cohorts on the margin are people born in 
1945-1947, the period of the Chinese Civil War (the battle between the 
Kuomintang and the Communist Party).  No one at that time could predict 
that the Chinese Communist Party would win the war in 1949 and establish a 
new government. Second, no one could predict that roughly 20 years later, 
Mao would launch his large-scale send-down movement; it is well 
documented that the mandatory policy came as an unexpected shock to most 
people (Bernstein (1977); Li et al. (2010)). Third, the construction of our 
assignment variable, birth cohort, is not based on the calendar but on the 
opening month of school, i.e., August versus September in the same year. 
Cesarean sections were not widely available across China in the 1940s, 
making it difficult to manipulate the timing of childbirth. Finally, anecdotal 
records suggest that there was no fixed day of school opening in 1930s in 
China, hence it is unlikely that people would manipulate the birth month of 
their children to let them enter schools earlier or later. 
To lend further support to our identifying assumption, we provide two sets 
of quantitative analyses suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010). First, if there 
is no strategic timing of birth, we will not find discontinuity in the density of 
birth cohort at the cutoff point (cohort 1947). Figure 2.1 reports the histogram 
of birth cohort; clearly, there is no discontinuity at cohort 1947 (the cutoff 
point) in either the urban or rural population. However, a concern about this 
density check is that our data come from a survey conducted in 2010, when 
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the relevant cohorts were in their 60s. If the probability of surviving up to the 
time of survey changes discontinuously at the cutoff point, it might be possible 
that this differential mortality rate cancels out the manipulation of childbirth 
timing, and so we do not find any discontinuity in the observed density of 
birth cohort in Figure 2.1. To check this possibility, we report in Appendix 
Figures A1-A3 the histogram of birth cohorts using China’s population 
censuses in 1982,
19
 1990, and 2000 when the cohorts on the margin were 
respectively, in their 30s, 40s, and 50s—ages at which the mortality rate is 
relatively low.  It is clear that none of these figures finds any discontinuity at 
cohort 1947. 
[Insert Figure 2.1 here] 
A second check for the validity of our research setup is to examine 
whether individuals’ predetermined socioeconomic characteristics are smooth 
at the cutoff point. Specifically, we examine gender, ethnic group, father’s 
education, mother’s education, number of siblings, and family background 
during the Cultural Revolution (i.e., revolutionary class, middle class, class 
enemies, and other classes). Figures 2.2A and 2.2B plot the differences in 
these socioeconomic variables across the send-down-eligible (i.e., urban junior 
high school or above graduates born after September 1946), and ineligible 
cohorts (i.e., urban junior high school or above graduates born before 
September 1946) as well as the 95% confidence intervals against different 
window lengths. As shown in the figures, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the mean difference between treatment group (send-down eligible 
cohorts) and control group (send-down ineligible cohorts) is zero at a 95% 
                                                 
19 The 1982 population census does not include the information necessary to break the 
population into rural and urban; hence, we draw the histogram for the whole population. 
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confidence interval up to a window of seven cohorts. We then test whether our 
treatment and control groups are balanced among all these socioeconomic 
characteristics within the seven cohorts’ window in Table 2.1. Columns 1 and 
3 report the mean values of the six socioeconomic characteristics for the seven 
ineligible and the seven eligible cohorts, whereas Columns 2 and 4 present the 
corresponding number of observations. The mean differences between 
ineligible and eligible cohorts and the p-value of the mean differences are 
reported in Columns 5 and 6, respectively. It is clear that these predetermined 
socioeconomic characteristics are balanced between our treatment and control 
groups. Accordingly, in the RD analysis, we focus on a window of seven 
cohorts on each side of the cutoff point (cohort 1947). 
[Insert Figures 2.2A and 2.2B here] 
[Insert Table 2.1 here] 
In summary, the exercises in this subsection suggest that there is no 
strategic timing of birth, and hence our estimation strategy is valid. 
 
2.3 Data and Variables 
Our primary dataset is the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) 2010, which 
contain surveys on economic and social beliefs and information on various 
individual characteristics. The CFPS, which is conducted by the Institute of 
Social Science Survey at Peking University and the Survey Research Center at 
the University of Michigan, is a nationally representative sample for China, 
covering 15,717 households and 33,600 adult respondents in 2010.
20
 
                                                 
20 The survey continued annually from 2010 to 2013; only the 2010 wave is complete and 
ready for use by researchers. 
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The key variables for our analysis are several measures of basic values as 
dependent variables, an indicator of sent-down experience as a regressor of 
interest, and an indicator of being born after September 1946 as an instrument. 
We focus on individuals’ values and preferences in three basic categories: 
family and relationships, success, and egalitarian society. The rationale for 
choosing these categories is that for the affected urban cohorts, the send-down 
movement meant separation from family and friends, harsh manual labor with 
low wages, and difficult living conditions. In Table 2.2, we list the variables 
for each category and the corresponding survey questions. All variables take 
discrete values from 1 to 5. For questions (1)-(5), 1 means not important and 5 
means very important. For question (6)-(9), 1 means strongly disagree and 5 
means strongly agree. 
[Insert Table 2.2 here] 
The CFPS contains information on whether the person experienced the 
send-down movement and his or her place of registered residence (hukou) at 
various ages. We use the hukou status at the age of 12 to identify urban youth, 
assuming that during junior and senior high school, the person was living in 
the region where he or she lived at 12. One concern is that people could have 
moved from urban to rural areas during that period, and thus avoided being 
sent down. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, the government strictly 
regulated urban- to-rural migration, and the hukou status was unlikely to be 
manipulated. 
The survey also contains rich data on demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics, such as family background, gender, age, education, marriage, 
family, labor-market status, and income. We focus on individuals born 
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between 1930 and 1992: Cohorts born before 1930 (citizens who were in their 
80s when the survey was conducted) have limited observations in our data and 
could suffer from selection bias, while those born after 1992 (those younger 
than 18) are still at the impressionable stage, when core beliefs and values 
have not yet crystallized. Our RD and RD-DD estimates exclude urban 
individuals with education below junior high school, as they were not subject 
to the mandatory send-down movement. The remaining sample contains 
31,819 individuals. Descriptive statistics for our variables are presented in 
Table 3. 
[Insert Table 2.3 here] 
Overall, our sample contains 5255 individuals with urban hukou at age 12, 
and 26,564 with rural hukou at age 12. The sent-down ratio is 12.4% for urban 
individuals and close to zero for rural individuals. Compared to their rural 
counterparts, urban individuals on average have higher education attainment, 
fewer siblings, more educated parents, and are less likely to belong to an 
ethnic minority. Urban and rural samples are similar in gender composition 
and family background during the Cultural Revolution. An average urban 
individual in the survey reported valuing family and relationships highly, 
rating the importance at 4.15-4.49 out of 5. Average attitudes toward wealth, 
luck and connections in determining success, and inequality were close to 
neutral (3.21-3.80 out of 5). Raw comparison of the means suggests that rural 
people seem to value family and relationships less and wealth more highly, 





2.4 Empirical Findings 
2.4.1 First Stage 
Figure 2.3 plots the relation between the sent-down experience (the regressor 
of interest) and birth cohort (the assignment variable) for the sample of urban 
junior high school or above graduates and the sample of rural individuals.  
Circles and triangles represent the ratio of being sent down for each cohort, 
and lines are the fitted values from the local polynomial regression with 
optimal bandwidth calculated using the methods in Imbens and Kalyanaraman 
(2012).  There is clearly a jump in the probability of being sent  down at 
cohort 1947 (the first cohort subject to the mandatory send-down movement) 
and a drop at cohort 1961 (the last cohort subject to the movement) for the 
sample of urban junior high school or above graduates. In contrast, for the 
sample of rural individuals, the probability of being sent down always remains 
close to zero, and there is no discontinuity at any cohorts. These results 
indicate the effectiveness of the policy changes in 1968 (the beginning of the 
mandatory send-down movement) and 1979 (the end of the movement), and 
support our research design (i.e., RD and RD-DD estimations). 
[Insert Figure 2.3 here] 
The regression results of the first-stage estimations are reported in 
upper panel of Tables 2.4 and 2.5, where Column 1 presents the RD estimation 
using seven cohorts of urban junior high school or above graduates on each 
side of the cutoff—cohort 1947—and Column 2 reports the RD-DD estimation 
using the full sample of urban junior high school or above graduates and rural 
individuals. The regression results confirm the pattern conveyed in Figure 2.3, 
that is, the mandatory send-down movement significantly increased the 
49 
 
probability of being sent down for urban educated youths. The weak 
instrument test suggests that our instrument is strong. 
[Insert Table 2.4 here] 
[Insert Table 2.5 here] 
 
2.4.2 Family and Relationships 
In the lower panel of Table 2.4, we investigate the effect of being sent down 
on individuals’ values regarding family and relationships. Specifically, we 
look at how people think about “Not feeling lonely” (outcome variable 
Companionship), “A loving relationship with spouse” (outcome variable 
Spouse), “Children being successful” (outcome variable Children), and “Not 
being disliked by others” (outcome variable Popularity), with a higher value 
meaning more importance. 
The RD estimation results are reported in Column 2, and the RD-DD 
estimation results are reported in Column 3. All RD-DD estimates are positive 
and statistically significant, indicating that the sent-down experience increases 
people’s values regarding the importance of family and relationships. While 
the RD estimates are mostly positive (except for the outcome variable 
Companionship), they are statistically insignificant, presumably due to the 
small sample size or the existence of cohort effect. In Column 5, we check 
whether the RD and RD-DD estimates are statistically different, and find that 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are statistically the same. 
To draw a more general conclusion about the sent-down effect on the 
value replaced on family and relationships, we follow Kling et al. (2004) in 
using the estimated average effect size (AES) index. Specifically, let    be 
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the estimated sent-down coefficient for the outcome variable k, and let   
  
denote the variance of outcome    for the control group. Then the AES index 







   , where K is the total number of outcome variables. 
The AES index has two advantages over the individual estimates: First, while 
results regarding each single outcome variable could potentially be due to 
chance (Type  I error), it is less likely for the AES index when several 
outcome variables are simultaneously summarized; and second, the AES index 
reduces the risk of low statistical power (Type II error). 
The AES index from the RD and RD-DD estimations are both positive, 
with the latter being statistically significant—further confirming that the 
sent-down experience causes people to value their family and relationships 
more highly. 
While the above instrumental variable estimations identify the TOT effect 
of the sent- down experience, Column 4 reports the ITT effect from the 
reduced-form RD-DD estimation. Consistently, we find positive and 
statistically significant effects of being sent down on values regarding family 
and relationships. The difference between the ITT and TOT effects reflects the 
compliance rate of being sent down, i.e.,  ̂     ̂     ̂, where  ̂ is the 
adjusted compliance rate or the coefficient in the first-stage regression. 
 
2.4.3 Success 
In the lower panel of Table 2.5, we examine whether the sent-down experience 
affects people’s beliefs about success. Specifically, we use four outcome 
variables to capture the value placed on success: importance of feeling 
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successful (outcome variable Achievement), views on “wealth reflects an 
individual’s achievement” (outcome variable Wealth), views on “luck is the 
most important factor determining future success” (outcome variable Luck), 
and views on “in current society, connections are more important than 
individual ability” (outcome variable Ability-Connection). For all outcome 
variables, higher values reflect greater importance. 
Columns 2 and 3 report the RD and RD-DD estimates, respectively. All 
RD-DD estimates are negative and statistically significant, while the RD 
estimates are mostly insignificant. Tests in Column 5 imply that the RD 
estimates are statistically similar to the RD-DD estimates. These results imply 
that the sent-down  experience causes people to be (1) less likely to believe 
that success is important, (2) less likely to view wealth as an indicator of 
individual achievement,  (3) less likely to believe in luck as the most 
important  factor of success, and (4) less likely to believe that connections are 
more important than ability. 
We report the AES index for the general effect of the sent-down 
experience on people’s views regarding success. For both the RD and RD-DD 
estimations, the AES index is negative with the latter being statistically 
significant. The negative AES index implies that in general, sent-down 
individuals are more likely to believe that ability is an important factor for 
success, and less likely to believe that success is important in life. 
 
2.4.4 Society 
Lastly, in the bottom rows of Table 2.5, we assess the sent-down effect on 
people’s views regarding the society.  Specifically, we use their views on 
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“economic prosperity has to come at the expense of larger income gaps” 
(outcome variable Inequality) to capture the beliefs about society. Again, a 
higher value means agreeing more strongly. 
 Both RD and RD-DD estimates are negative, though the former is 
imprecisely estimated. These results imply that the sent-down experience 
causes people to value an egalitarian society more highly. 
 
2.4.5 Robustness Checks 
In this subsection, we present several robustness checks on our main results. 
As the RD and RD-DD estimates are statistically indifferent for all outcome 
variables, and the latter has the advantage of more precise estimation, we 
focus on the RD-DD estimates (results for RD estimates are available upon 
request). 
Including predetermined socioeconomic characteristics. As a first 
robustness check, we follow Lee and Lemieux (2010)’s suggestion by 
including predetermined socioeconomic characteristics; if our RD-DD 
approach is valid, including socioeconomic controls should have little effect 
on our estimator  ̂     . As shown in Column 1 of Table 2.6, estimates 
remain robust to these additional controls, implying the validity of our 
identification strategy.  
Checks on the Great Famine effect. Our RD-DD regression sample 
includes the Great Famine period (1959-1961), which substantially affected 
rural areas while leaving urban areas largely unaffected.  Such differential 
impact between rural and urban individuals could potentially contaminate our 
RD-DD estimates. To check whether our results are driven instead by the 
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Great Famine effect, we conduct two sensitivity exercises. First, we drop the 
cohorts born during the Great Famine period (cohorts 1959-1961).  As shown 
in Column 2 of Table 2.6, our estimates remain similar. Second, we include an 
additional variable, the self-reported health condition, to control for the most 
important detrimental effect of the Great Famine. Still, our estimates remain 
robust (i.e., Column 3 of Table 2.6). These exercises suggest that our findings 
are largely not driven by the Great Famine effect. 
Placebo test using urban primary school or below graduates as the 
treatment group. Note that urban individuals with primary schooling or 
below were immune to the mandatory send-down movement. Intuitively, we 
can do a placebo test by comparing the outcomes of urban primary school or 
below graduates with the outcomes of rural individuals (our control group 
used in the aforementioned regressions): any significant findings would 
indicate the existence of omitted variables and the failure of our research 
design. The regression results are reported in Column 4 of Table 2.6. It is clear 
that most of the estimates do not have any statistical power, and their 
magnitudes are also quite small. 
[Insert Table 2.6 here] 
 
2.5 Interpretation of Empirical Results and Competing 
Hypotheses 
2.5.1 Life of the Sent-down Youths 
We relate our findings—sent-down people values regarding family, 
relationships, success, and society—to the difficult experiences in their early 
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lives. Theories and findings from psychology suggest that basic values are 
formed during adolescence and early adulthood and after this critical age 
change only slightly. Most relevant to our study, the impressionable years 
hypothesis states that core beliefs and values form, develop, and mature during 
a period of great mental plasticity in adolescence and early 
adulthood—generally considered age 12-18—and remain largely unchanged 
thereafter  (Krosnick and Alwin 1989, Alwin and Krosnick 1991, Meadow 
1982, Merelman 197)). 
Consistent with the hypothesis from psychology, our findings show that 
being sent down—a dramatic and, for most people, traumatic life 
event—during the critical years of adolescence and early adulthood shape 
basic socioeconomic values and that the effects are statistically and 
economically significant. 
We believe two aspects of send-down are most relevant to the basic values 
examined in this paper: separation from family and home, and the hardship of 
labor and rural living. First, for all the affected youths, the movement 
amounted to deportation from their family and homes. Some of the teenagers 
were sent to remote areas and border regions and not allowed to visit families 
for several years. Xi Jinping, the party chief since 2012, was sent to the poor 
northern Chinese province of Shaanxi when he was 15, and only returned 
home seven years later. Documentation reveals that the send-down movement 
ripped millions of families apart. 
Cao (a sent-down woman from Shanghai) is also tormented by the thought 
that she may have increased her parents’ suffering. Like Ma’s family, Cao’s 
mother was attacked in the Cultural Revolution. She died soon after Cao’s 
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return home. “I keep thinking I could have taken care of her if I’d been there. 
She might have lived longer,” she says. (Hille (2013)) 
Second, life in rural areas was difficult for the youths, in both body and 
mind. In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a wide chasm in living environments 
between urban and rural areas in China. Before being sent down, most urban 
youths had never lived in a rural area, or engaged in hard labor on a farm and 
in a forest. During their years in the countryside, they did harsh labor for long 
hours every day, yet received only a small wage in return. 
A father wrote to a magazine about his daughter’s daily life in the 
mountain areas: 
For some time after her arrival Yung-hung [his daughter] showed 
enthusiasm and vigor in her work. But not long afterward, she began to write 
in her letters about the rural hardships. . . “When I go out of my house, I have 
to climb slopes. When I go to the fields, I have to cross the mountains. I rise 
very early in the morning and do not return until it is dark. . . ” (Bernstein, 
1977, p.121) 
A teacher wrote to Mao about his son’s situation: 
My son graduated from middle school in 1968 and went to countryside in 
1969. . .  In mountain areas, he does agricultural labor for the whole year, 
but obtains not enough food to eat, nor one cent of income. . .  After finishing 
the vegetables, he has no money to buy more; his clothes have been worn out 
during the labor, but he has no money to buy new ones; when he was sick, he 
cannot even afford for seeing the doctor. (Gu and Hu, 1996, p.116-117) 
We interpret our findings as the effect of this harsh experience in early life 
on individuals’ core values. More specifically, the separation from family and 
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homes affected values regarding family and relationships, and doing hard 
labor for low income may have shaped their values concerning achievement, 
wealth, and equality. 
To provide further support to our above argument, we conduct the 
following quantitative analysis, using CFPS data on where sent-down cohorts 
came from and where they went. We then calculate the ratio of disposable 
income in the destination county over that in the source city, and interact it 
with the send-down status variable. If our argument is valid, the send-down 
effects should be stronger for people who went to poorer areas and 
experienced tougher childhoods. Indeed, we find such results in Table 2.7: 
AES indices of the interaction terms have the same sign as the main effects 
and are statistically significant for the value placed on family and relationships 
and society. 
[Insert Table 2.7 here] 
 
2.5.2 Competing Hypotheses 
In this subsection, we discuss the relevance of several other hypotheses that 
may also explain our findings. 
Educational attainment. During the Cultural Revolution, high schools 
and universities across China were closed. Sent-down youths may have either 
delayed or completely forgone the opportunity for higher education. Education 
could have effects on basic values; for instance, more educated people may 
define themselves as more liberal and have different views on social/economic 
issues than less educated individuals. Our findings could then be explained by 
disrupted education instead of by a tough experience in the countryside. 
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To assess this competing hypothesis, we examine the effect of send-down 
on individuals’ educational attainment. Using total years of education as the 
outcome variable, we found positive effect from send-down (Table 2.8): 
Compared to the non-sent-down cohorts, the sent- down individuals had 
slightly more schooling (1.617 years). We further include education as a 
control variable in the RD-DD specification. The coefficients on each outcome 
variable as well as the AES index remain similar to the results in Table 2.4 and 
2.5. Education, therefore, is not the main channel through which send-down 
affects people’s beliefs. 
[Insert Table 2.8 here] 
City violence. The mandatory send-down movement occurred during the 
Cultural Revolution, which unleashed great violence and chaos in cities but 
not in rural areas. Hence, our findings could be explained by escape from 
violence and chaos in cities, rather than by the hardships in rural areas. 
However, both anecdotal and analytical evidence suggest that this is not the 
main reason. First, one widely held conjecture about why Mao launched the 
send-down movement on such a large scale is that the Red Guards (which 
consisted mostly of teenagers) became a destructive force (e.g., destroying 
schools and factories, harassing ordinary citizens, and engaging in robbery and 
other criminal behavior), and the send-down was used to defuse the Red 
Guards and reduce the chaos. In other words, our treatment and control groups 
in the cities largely experienced a similar degree of violence and chaos; hence, 
city violence should not drive our results. 
Second, to provide some quantitative evidence, we divide our sample 
provinces into two groups according to their violence level during the Cultural 
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Revolution: Fierce violence and less violence.
21
 Specifically, we calculate 
how many violent events happened between May 1966 and December 1968 in 
each province from the Memorabilia of the Red Guards (Jiang (1994)), and 
classify a province as a fierce-violence province if at least two major events 
occurred and as a less-violence province otherwise. As the sent-down cohorts 
from different provinces were largely blended in the same rural areas, any 
differential estimates between these groups would indicate the effect of city 
violence. Regression results are reported in Table 2.9. It is clear that most of 
our estimates are statistically indifferent between the fierce-violence group 
and the less-violence group, implying that the effect of city violence does not 
drive our results. 
[Insert Table 2.9 here] 
Disciplined responses. While the sent-down movement was used to discipline 
teenagers in cities, it is possible that our estimates are mainly driven by how 
people respond to the surveys, i.e., sent-down people answered questions 
differently from non-sent-down people. We conduct two exercises to check 
the credibility of this explanation. First, the sent-down movement was largely 
a political movement; hence, if a disciplined response is driving our results, 
we should be more likely to find differential answers among questions related 
to politics. To this end, we use a survey question about the overall evaluation 
of the local government (with a higher value indicating a better evaluation). 
We construct two variables accordingly: a dummy variable indicating whether 
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 Alternatively, we group provinces by their distance from Beijing, on the assumption that 
the farther from Beijing (where the central government is located and which was the center of 
the Red Guards Movement), the weaker influence the central government had and the less 
violence. We did not find differential estimates across groups based on the distance from 




the respondent answered this question and, if so, a categorical variable 
indicating the value of evaluation. Regression results are reported in Table 10, 
upper panel (subjective measures). We do not find any significant results, and 
the magnitudes of estimated coefficients are close to zero. This suggests that 
the disciplined-response explanation is not a driving force for findings. 
[Insert Table 2.10 here] 
Second, while our estimations are based on subjective questions that could 
be affected by response behavior, we check whether objective questions 
related to values regarding family relationships, success, and society produce 
consistent results. Specifically, we examine the following variables: marital 
status, the frequency of interactions with neighbors (previous month), the 
frequency of interactions with relatives (previous month), and donations to 
organizations or individuals (previous year). The first three variables are 
related to the value placed on family and relationships whereas the last one is 
related to beliefs about society. Regression results are reported in lower panel 
of Table 2.10 (objective behaviors). We find respondents’ behavior consistent 
with results on beliefs: The sent-down experience causes people to be more 
likely to be married, to interact with neighbors and relatives, and to donate 
money. 
 
2.6 Heterogeneous Effects 
In this section, we investigate whether the effect of the send-down experience 
differs across gender and family background, etc. We include interaction terms 
between send-down and different characteristics in the RD-DD regression: 
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Where     are the group dummies (being male or with a particular family 
background); and     and         are instrumented by             
and                , respectively. We focus on the AES indices for a 
general effect and report the results in Table 2.11 (the full set of individual 
estimates are available upon request). 
[Insert Table 2.11 here] 
Gender. First, we examine whether males and females respond to being 
sent down similarly. While sociology and psychology provide mixed views 
regarding the presence of gender difference in values,
22
 there is broad 
agreement that women are more likely to have other-regarding values—for 
instance, attitudes toward family and equality. Moreover, both physiology and 
behavioral studies have documented gender differences in response to stress;
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hence we may expect differences in beliefs and values between sent-down 
women and men. 
In estimating the heterogeneous effects across gender, notice that the 
coefficient of send-down (  ) shows the effect of send-down on females, 
while       shows the effect of send- down on males. As shown in the first 
panel of Table 11, the coefficients of the interaction term (  ) are all 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that the effect of the send-down 
experience is similar across gender. 
Number of Siblings. Second, we check whether the effect of send-down 
depends on the number of siblings an individual had. The rationale is related 
                                                 
22 For a review of experimental evidence on gender differences in preference, see Croson  
and Gneezy (2009). 
23 In particular, researchers have found that females’ responses are more marked by a pattern 




to peer effects: In many cities, families were allowed to choose which of their 
eligible children would go down (Li et al. 2010). Having more siblings, thus, 
may enhance the sent-down effect, as the contrast with other siblings may 
magnify perceived difficulties in the countryside. Alternatively, interactions 
with and support from siblings may moderate the impact from send-down. The 
net effect, therefore, depends on the relative magnitude of the two forces. 
As shown in the second panel of Table 2.11, we find that for people with 
more siblings, the impact of the send-down experience on the value placed on 
family and relationships and an egalitarian society is slightly smaller. For 
these particular beliefs, therefore, the net effect from siblings seems to 
counteract the send-down intervention. The effects on the attitudes toward 
success do not vary by the number of siblings. 
Ethnicity. Next, we check whether ethnic minorities are affected by the 
send-down experience in a different way from Han people. Non-Han people 
accounted for less than 6% of the population in the 1960s, and could be 
affected differently by the send-down movement than Han people for three 
reasons. First, ethnic groups hold different cultural and religious beliefs, which 
directly shape core values. Second, minority groups, whether ethnic or racial, 
may face discrimination in their economic and activities, which might 
aggravate their harsh experiences in the countryside. Lastly, their small 
population and networks may have provided very limited support for coping 
with distress and difficult situations. 
As shown in the third panel of Table 2.11, we find that the send-down 
experience affects the value placed on family and relationships more for ethnic 
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minorities than for the Han individuals. The effects on other belief measures, 
such as success and society, do not vary by the number of siblings. 
Parents’ education. We also consider the heterogeneity across parents’ 
education levels. Recent models endogenize attitudes by assuming that 
individuals’ attitudes are influenced by the attitudes of their parents.24 As 
education shapes individuals’ values and parents transmit values to their 
children, more educated parents may affect their children’s value formation in 
a different way than less educated parents. 
Results are presented in the fourth and fifth panels of Table 2.11. It is clear 
that parents’ education moderates (reduces) the impact of the send-down 
experience on values regarding family and relationships, as well as an 
egalitarian society. Compared with sent-down youths from less-educated 
families, sent-down youths with more highly educated parents, especially 
more educated father, place less value on family and relationships, and agree 
less on an egalitarian society. 
Family background during the Cultural Revolution. Lastly, we test 
whether the send-down effect differs for youths from various family 
backgrounds, and in particular, their political identities. During the Cultural 
Revolution, households were categorized by political identity, such as class 
enemies, revolutionary class, and middle class. Although send-down was 
mandatory for eligible youths from all classes, the intensity—and, hence, 
resulting effects—may differ. For instance, the anti-revolutionary class was 
considered to be a bad background, and once sent down, individuals from such 
                                                 
24 See for example, Bisin and Verdier (2000) models intergenerational transmission of ethnic 
and religious traits through family.  Bisin et al. (2004) and Dohmen et al. (2012) provide 




families might be isolated from peers, treated hostilely, and more likely to be 
assigned to challenging jobs. It is possible that their experiences and resulting 
changes in values are different from those with “superior” backgrounds such 
as coming from the revolutionary class. 
We group family backgrounds into four categories (i.e., revolutionary 
class, middle class, class enemies, and other classes) and interact them with 
the send-down instrument. As shown in Table 2.12, the coefficients of the 
interaction terms are not significant, implying that the effect of send-down 
does not vary by the family political identity. 
[Insert Table 2.12 here] 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
We demonstrate that difficult experiences during the critical teen years and 
early adulthood affect values and beliefs about family, success and equality. In 
particular, we examine the impact of the send-down movement in China, 
during which eligible youths in urban areas were forced to leave their homes 
to work and live in the countryside. Using regression discontinuity and 
controlling for cohort effects, we find that individuals who were sent down to 
the countryside value family and friends more highly, are less likely to believe 
that luck is the most important factor in determining success, and support 
more egalitarian society. 
Our results suggest that the effect is not driven by differences in 
educational attainment, city violence caused by the Cultural Revolution, or 
different motivation in answering questions; this illustrates, therefore, that 
early experience has a significant and persistent impact on basic values. By 
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providing empirical evidence on the development of basic values, this paper 
links economics to hypotheses from psychology, and also contributes to 


























Adolescent Adversity and Long-run Health 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A key question in human development is what causes health inequalities over 
the life cycle. A growing literature shows that conditions in prenatal and early 
childhood explain health inequalities in prime-age adults, and that investment 
before age 5 has large payoffs for future health (Heckman and Kautz 2014). In 
contrast, adolescent and adult programs have not been established to be as 
effective as programs that target earlier ages, partly due to participants’ 
selection into the program and the evaluations’ short-term follow-ups 
(Heckman and Mosso 2014). Moreover, many of the adolescent evaluations 
focus on labor market outcomes rather than non-cognitive skills, which are 
largely formed, developed, and shaped during the teen years. 
In this paper, we exploit a large-scale, mandatory social movement to 
investigate the effect of adolescent and early adulthood adversity on long-run 
health. Specifically, we study the impact of the send-down movement in 
China, a mandatory urban-to-rural migration that forced 17 million urban 
youths to live and work in the countryside for years. Employing survey data 
from 2010, we are able to examine the impact on their physical and mental 
health conditions 40 years after the experience for long-term follow-up. 
In December 1968, the then-leader of China, Mao Zedong, initiated a 
national movement to send junior and senior high school students in the cities 
to rural areas. The eligible urban youths were suddenly exiled to the 
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countryside to live in a less modern environment which they had not 
experienced before. In most cases, they lived without running water, 
electricity, or a proper sanitation infrastructure, and had to perform hard labor 
every day. Further, they were not allowed to visit family for several years. By 
the late 1970s, more than 17 million people had been rusticated (Pan 2002). 
This unexpected and mandatory movement provides us with a 
regression discontinuity (RD) design to estimate the impact of adolescent 
adversity on long-run health. Starting in 1968, the scheme applied to all 
eligible urban individuals who would graduate from junior or senior high 
school. The first sent-down cohort, birth cohort 1947, was the cutoff for being 
sent down: The cohort born just after 1947 was forced to be rusticated, 
whereas the cohort born just before 1947 was not subject to the scheme and 
therefore constitutes a good counterfactual. Meanwhile, to deal with the cohort 
effect—that individuals born just before and just after 1947 could differ for 
reasons unrelated to the send-down experience—we use the policy-ineligible 
sample (including urban individuals with primary schooling or below and rural 
residents) to estimate the difference in health between cohorts born right 
before and right after 1947, and subtract it from the estimate using the 
policy-eligible sample—a combined RD and difference-in-difference 
(RD-DD) estimator. 
We examine the impact of the send-down experience on a range of 
physical and mental health outcomes observed in 2010, about 40 years after 
the shock. Both anecdotal evidence and quantitative exercises (i.e., the density 
check and balancing tests of predetermined characteristics) support the idea 
that individuals did not manipulate their birth month and year to avoid being 
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sent down, which is the key identifying assumption of our RD-DD estimation. 
We found that the sent-down youths who were placed in a less modern 
environment (post-1947 birth cohorts) present poorer health status, especially 
for mental status: They are 44 percentage points more likely to develop 
chronic diseases and report a more severe level of mental disorders including 
amnesia, distress, anxiety and restlessness. The results are robust to a battery 
of robust checks. 
The large effects on mental health are consistent with 
social-psychology theories on early adulthood. Adolescence and early 
adulthood is a period of great mental plasticity, when non-cognitive and 
personality skills are formed, developed, and shaped by experience (Alwin and 
Krosnick 1991). Hardships in the countryside and separation from family are 
crucial to the youths’ mental conditions and long-term development. In 
addition to the contemporaneous shocks, the effects of this adversity may still 
be felt many years later; in our context, 40 years. In contrast, most indicators 
of physical health status, including BMI, hospitalization, and overall comfort, 
were not particularly worse compared to the non-sent-down groups. It is 
possible that by early adulthood, physical conditions are relatively mature and 
less vulnerable to environmental shocks than mental conditions. 
We also test the importance of various subsequent pathways 
—educational attainment, income, marriage, and childbearing—that may lead 
to long-run health outcomes. By estimating the effect of send-down on several 
indicators of socioeconomic status, we do not find evidence that the 
send-down experience affects the individual’s total years of schooling, 
income, marriage status in 2010, age of first marriage and childbirth, or the 
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number of children. Hence we can reject the chain of causation that runs from 
the send-down experience to educational attainment, labor and marriage 
market outcomes, and finally to long-run health status. 
Lastly, we examine the presence of heterogeneous effects in particular, 
the impact of the send-down experience across gender and number of siblings. 
Overall, we find that the effect on long-run health is quite general, with 
slightly stronger effects for (1) females to have chronic diseases and (2) youths 
with fewer siblings to have physical and mental problems. 
This paper contributes to a better understanding of the relationship 
between early-life conditions and later life wellbeing. Heckman (2000) argues 
that early investments in human capital for children have a large payoff. A 
large number of studies evaluate programs targeting early childhood, such as 
policies to extend maternity leave (Tanaka 2005; Carneiro et al. 2010; 
Rasmussen 2010; Dustmann and Schonberg 2012); Head Start which provides 
health and other social services to poor children age 3 to 5 (Currie and Thomas 
1995; Garces et al. 2002; Ludwig and Miller 2007); and the Moving to 
Opportunities (MTO) program, which moves low-income families to better 
residential neighborhoods (Katz et al. 2001; Ludwig et al. 2001; Kling et al. 
2005; Sanbonmatsu et al. 2006; Kling et al. 2007; Ludwig et al. 2011, 2012, 
2013). Another line of literature examines exogenous conditions and unusual 
shocks, such as disease breakouts at the fetal stage (Almond 2006), 
environmental factors and economic circumstance at birth (Maccini and Yang 
2009; Fenske et al. 2014), the loss of a parent (Adda et al. 2011), extreme 
draught and civil war (Alderman et al. 2006), political instability (Dupas and 
Robinson 2012) and famine (Meng and Qian 2009). In comparison, we 
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examine a category of adolescent shocks that is more relevant to the lives of 
rural populations in developing countries today. For example, these findings 
will help us to understand the consequences and overall welfare effect of 
public policies that facilitate migration but leave behind the children of 
migrant workers. They will also help justify programs that target 
disadvantaged teenagers and their families. 
Our study has several additional features that distinguish it from 
existing research. First, evaluations of adolescent programs usually follow 
participants for no longer than 20 years. Short-term follow-up could lead to 
biased estimates of returns—upward-biased if the benefits eventually dissipate 
or downward-biased if the effects take place later in life (Heckman and Mosso 
2014). In contrast, we examine the long-term outcome, thereby revealing the 
long-lasting impact of adolescent conditions. To study the impact of early 
intervention over the life cycle, Gould et al. (2011) examine Operation Magic 
Carpet in which Yemenite children were airlifted to Israel. Their study is close 
to ours in terms of the long-term nature of the effects, but we further innovate 
by employing an identification strategy closer to a random experiment. 
Second, many programs target specific demographic or disadvantaged groups, 
while the event in our setting applied to all eligible youths at the time, 
regardless of family income or background. It thus allows us to avoid any 
selection concern—i.e., that participants chose to enter or avoid the 
program—and also to apply the findings to a more general population. Third, 
we provide results for a battery of physical and mental health indicators—a 
major addition to evaluations in which measures of health outcomes are 
coarse, or non-cognitive skills are absent. 
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This paper is also related to the literature of the origins of health 
inequalities. Besides the studies of early-life conditions, a line of literature 
focuses on how socioeconomic status and conditions affect non-cognitive 
development and health conditions. Adams et al. (2003) and Adda et al. 
(2003) find that socioeconomic status appears to have stronger links with 
mental and chronic illnesses than with acute and sudden-onset health 
conditions. For more specific causes, Adda et al. (2009), Fiorini and Keane 
(2013) and Cornaglia et al. (2014) identify the effect on health of income 
shocks, children’s activity, and crime, respectively. There is also a 
well-established correlation between health and education (Grossman 2006; 
Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2010; Clark and Royer 2013).
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly 
describes the send- down movement in China and outlines the estimation 
strategy. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 reports the main findings and 
estimates of the send-down effect, and describes several robustness checks. 
Section 5 discusses possible interpretations of our findings and the relevance 
of competing hypotheses. Section 6 explores the heterogeneity of the effects 
across individual characteristics. Section 7 concludes. 
 
3.2 Estimation Strategy 
3.2.1 The Send-down Movement 
The “Up to the Mountain and Down to the Countryside Movement” (also 
called the send- down movement) in China was a massive movement of 
                                                 
25 Clark and Royer (2013) find little causal effect on health thus suggest caution as to the 
likely health returns to educational interventions. 
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educated youths who left their urban homes to live and work in rural areas. 
Beginning in the 1950s, as a policy response to urban employment and rural 
development problems, it evolved into a political movement during the 
Cultural Revolution and affected millions of urban youths until it ended in 
1978. 
A small-scale send-down movement started in the early 1950s, 
following Mao Zedong’s rallying cry to develop remote regions. In 1955, Mao 
commented that “the countryside is a vast expanse of heaven and earth where 
we can flourish,” an attempt to direct the urban unemployed to rural areas. The 
early phase of the send-down movement was mostly voluntary. 
On December 22, 1968, Mao suddenly asserted that “intellectual youth 
must go to the countryside, and will be educated from living in rural poverty,” 
and called for a nationwide mandatory movement of urban youth to the 
countryside. This 1968 directive marked the official beginning of the 
mandatory and large-scale send-down. The policy came as a shock to the 
people, forcing millions of youths out of the cities and exiling them to the 
countryside and remote regions. Specifically, the mandatory policy launched 
in 1968 applied to individuals who were registered as urban residents and 
graduating from junior or senior high school. As colleges had been shut down 
nationally since 1966, six cohorts of graduates (i.e., 1966-1968 cohorts of 
junior and senior high school graduates) were sent down together in 1968. 
Though some youths were inspired by the revolutionary and patriotic 
propaganda, most did not want to be separated from their families or give up 
the better life and work opportunities in urban areas. Many families with 
eligible youths were forced, under political pressure, to cooperate; parents 
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were often threatened with job loss. One sent-down individual recounted his 
experience: 
I was only 15 when I was sent down. No one wanted to go, but no one 
could resist. When I refused to go, those in charge of the residential committee 
came to our home every day and asked us to study Chairman Mao’s 
instructions. A member of the worker’s propaganda team came to live in our 
home and organized a study team for my family. My father was a cadre. He 
was locked up in a study team in his workplace and was not allowed to return 
home until his children agreed to go to the rural area. In the end, my mother 
begged me to go to the rural area. (Deng, 1993, p.60) 
The government relaxed enforcement after 1977, and brought some 
youths back to join the urban labor force or enter college. By 1979, Mao’s 
successors had denounced the send- down policy and allowed all the affected 
youths to return to their home regions. From 1968 to 1978, roughly 17 million 
people, or 10.5% of the non-farming population at that time, were sent down 
to rural areas (Pan 2002). 
 
3.2.2 Life of the Sent-Down Youths 
In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a wide gap in living environments between 
urban and rural areas in China due to the Big Push Development Strategy 
adopted in the 1950s (Naughton 2006). To the sent-down youths, moving to a 
rural area amounted to poverty at both material and spiritual levels. They 
encountered difficulties in adapting to the lower standard of living and 
sanitation, strenuous physical labor, lack of cultural and spiritual activities, 
and separation from their family. 
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A basic problem for the urban youths was to adapt to a lower standard 
of living; for instance, to live without electricity or running water. In the 
midwest, where rainfall was scarce, the youths had to travel miles to fetch 
water in buckets for a minimum amount of hygiene. Their rural diet mainly 
consisted of coarse grain and corn; at the time, vegetables were expensive on 
the free market and meat was difficult to find (Bonnin and Horko 2013). 
Harmful insects such as mosquitos and whitmania pigra were widespread in 
the countryside. 
Like the peasants, the youths devoted most time of the day to 
agricultural labor which was scarcely mechanized at the time. They performed 
hard manual work for 10 hours per day, and in harvest months, almost 16 
hours. They were paid by efficiency units and could barely remain 
self-sufficient. A teacher wrote to Mao about his son’s situation: 
My son graduated from middle school in 1968 and went to countryside 
in 1969. . . In mountain areas, he did agricultural labor for the whole year, 
but obtained not enough food to eat, nor one cent of income. . . when he was 
sick, he cannot even afford for seeing the doctor. (Gu and Hu, 1996, 
p.116-117) 
The monotony of life and the lack of cultural activities was also a huge 
change from life in the city. There were only limited social activities or 
entertainment after work. Reading and writing were difficult by the light of an 
oil lamp and without a table. Most inhumanely, the experience amounted to 
deportation from their families and homes. Some of the teenagers were sent to 




Cao [a sent-down woman from Shanghai] is also tormented by the 
thought that she may have increased her parents’ suffering. Like Ma’s family, 
Cao’s mother was attacked in the Cultural Revolution. She died soon after 
Cao’s return home. “I keep thinking I could have taken care of her if I’d been 
there. She might have lived longer,” she says. (Hille 2013) 
 
3.2.3 Estimation Framework 
The send-down policy moved millions of teenagers from urban to rural areas 
and turned their early adulthood upside down. The unexpected launch of the 
mandatory movement in December 1968 provides us with some randomness 
to identify the effect of adolescent adversity on long-run health outcomes. 
Specifically, we use the regression discontinuity (RD) framework, which is 
arguably the closest in the observational data analysis to an experimental 
design (e.g., Lee and Lemieux 2010). 
As an illustration of the RD framework, consider the following Rubin 
causal model: Let     outcome (i.e., measures of physical and mental health 
status; see Section 3.3 for details) of individual i being sent down to the 
countryside and hence experiencing great hardship in his/her early adulthood; 
let     be the outcome in the absence of send-down; and denote    as the 
send-down status, i.e., 1 if individual i was sent down and 0 otherwise. The 
effect of sent-down is identified as 
   [       ]                 
However, as we cannot observe for individual   both his/her    and    , the 
comparison of outcomes between the sent-down group (i.e.,   =1) and the 
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non-sent-down group (i.e.,   =0) could be biased due to the selection issue, 
i.e.,  [        ]   [        ]   
The sudden and mandatory send-down movement in 1968 implies that 
the probability of being sent to the rural areas is discontinuous at a cutoff point 
   of the birth cohort (  ), i.e.,         [     ]          [     ]. Assuming 
 [        ] is continuous in   at    (later we will formally check this key 
identifying assumption), Hahn et al. (2001) show that   can be identified as  
   
    
 
 [       ]     
    
 
 [       ]
   
    
 
 [       ]     
    
 
 [       ]
  ̂                  
Empirically, the RD estimation uses the sample of all urban junior high 
school or above graduates, as they were subject to the scheme. The assignment 
variable in our RD estimation, birth cohort (c), is a grade-based birth 
cohort—that is, students born in different months but in the same grade. Since 
its establishment, China has followed the former Soviet Union and used 
September as the school opening month. Therefore, in constructing our 
assignment variable, we define a birth cohort as those born between 
September (of the previous year) and August (of the current year). For 
example, cohort 1947 consists of students born between September 1946 and 
August 1947. 
The oldest cohort affected was those who graduated from senior high 
school in 1966. The school starting age was 7 in the 1950s-1980s, the 
completion of the primary grades and junior and senior high school took 6 
years, 3 years, and 3 years, respectively. Hence, the first cohort affected is 
cohort 1947; accordingly, we set the cutoff point as        . 
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Lee and Lemieux (2010) shows that the RD estimator (3.2) is essentially 
an instrumental variable estimator. Specifically, the first stage of the 
instrumental variable estimation has the following specification 
     [     ]                           
and the reduced-form is 
     [     ]                           
where  [ ] is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if the argument in 
the bracket is true and 0 if it is false; and      and      are flexible functions 
of   , controlling for the direct effect of birth cohort on outcome variables. 
Hence, the RD estimator is  ̂   
 ̂       
 ̂     
. 
One potential concern about the above RD estimator is that it may also 
capture the effect of birth cohorts on the margin—that is, people from 
grade-based birth cohorts on the margin (i.e., cohort 1947 vs. cohort 1946, 
given that        ) are inherently different for reasons unrelated to the 
send-down movement. In other words,  ̂      and  ̂        become 
 ̂            and  ̂           , and the RD estimator becomes 
 ̂   
  ̂       
  ̂     
 
       




    
Assuming that the effects of birth cohort on the margin (i.e.,       
and      ) are the same for the send-down eligible and ineligible groups, we 
address this concern by including all send-down ineligible groups as a control, 
or a combined RD and difference-in-differences (RD-DD) analysis. Since 
there is no send-down for the ineligible groups,  ̂                 and 
 ̂                   should only capture cohort effects on the margin, i.e., 
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 ̂                      ,  ̂                        . The RD-DD estimator can 
then recover the effect of send-down 
 ̂      
  ̂                  ̂                  
  ̂                 ̂                
                   
Two issues are worth noting here. First, how to estimate      and 
    . Lee and Card (2008) point out that when the assignment variable (birth 
cohort in our case) is discrete, one cannot use the nonparametric estimation, 
even on data of infinite observations. Following their suggestion, we use a 
lower-order polynomial function, with various polynomial orders and with or 
without varying slopes across the cutoff point   . The second issue is how to 
estimate the standard error. Following the tradition in the literature (see Lee 
and Lemieux 2010), we use the standard errors clustered at the birth cohort 
level for the RD estimator. The standard errors of the RD-DD estimator 
 ̂      are computed by bootstrapping using the birth cohort level as the 
resampling cluster. We obtain similar results for  ̂      by the delta method, 
which assumes that estimators from both send-down-eligible and 
send-down-ineligible are uncorrelated. 
 
3.3 Data and Variables 
Data. Our primary data source is the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) 
2010, a nationally representative sample of Chinese communities, families, 
and individuals, that covers 25 of 31 provinces/regions (the six omitted 
provinces are Hainan, Inner Mongolia, Ninxia, Qinghai, Tibet and Xinjiang) 
and 95% of the total population of China in 2010. Sampling for the 2010 
CFPS was drawn with implicit stratification through a multistage probability. 
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Specifically, five provinces/regions (i.e., Gansu, Guangdong, Henan, 
Liaoning, and Shanghai) were chosen for initial oversampling (1,600 
households in each) to achieve regional comparisons, and the remaining 8000 
households were drawn through weighting from the other provinces/regions to 
make the overall CFPS sample representative of the country. The final sample 
included 15,717 households and 33,600 adult respondents in 2010. 
The 2010 CFPS consisted of 4 questionnaires (Community, Family, 
Adolescent, and Adult), which included most questions covered in four U.S. 
counterpart datasets (PSID, CDS, HRS, and NYLS). It contains rich 
information on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, such as 
gender, date of birth (month and year), ethnicity, marital status, educational 
attainment, family background, registered residency (or hukou in Chinese), 
type of residency (rural or urban), employment status, etc. 
Health outcomes. Most relevant to our study, the 2010 CFPS asked 
respondents multiple questions about their physical and mental health status. 
Four questions can be directly linked to an individual’s physical health 
conditions, from which we construct four 1/0 binary outcome variables 
reflecting the respondent’s physical health status. The first measure, denoted 
Abnormal BMI, indicates whether an individual is underweight (BMI <19.5) 
or overweight (BMI>25).
26
 The second, denoted Chronic, takes a value of 1 if 
the respondent answered “yes” to the survey question “During the past six 
months, have you had any doctor-diagnosed chronic disease?” and 0 
otherwise. The third, denoted Hospitalized, takes a value of 1 if the respondent 
answered “yes” to the question “Were you hospitalized last year due to 
                                                 
26Results using only overweight or underweight are similar (available upon request). 
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illness/injury?” and 0 otherwise. The last variable, denoted Uncomfortable, 
takes a value of 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question “During  
the past two weeks, have you felt physically uncomfortable?” and 0 otherwise. 
The 2010 CFPS asked seven questions related to mental health 
conditions, six of which belong to the 10-question Kessler Psychological 
Distress Scale (K10).
27
 Respondent were asked to rate, on a scale from 1 to 5, 
the frequency or severity of certain symptoms. We construct seven variables 
accordingly, all of which take values from 1 to 5: Forgetful, Depressed, 
Nervous, Restless, Hopeless, Difficult, and Worthless. Specifically, (1) 
Forgetful is derived from the question “Are you able to remember the 
important things that have happened to you in the past week?”, with 1 
meaning “able to remember all of them” and 5 meaning “able to remember a 
little bit”. The other six variables reflect the frequency of corresponding 
symptoms, with 1 meaning never and 5 meaning almost every day: (2) 
Depressed: “How often did you feel depressed and cannot cheer up in the past 
month?”; (3) Nervous: “How often did you feel nervous in the past month?”; 
(4) Restless: “How often did you feel agitated or upset and could not remain 
calm in the past month?”; (5) Hopeless: “How often did you feel hopeless in 
the past month?”; (6) Difficult: “How often did you find it difficult to do 
everything in the past month?”; and (7) Worthless: “How often do you think 
life is meaningless?” In Table 3.1, we list the health measures for the two 
categories (physical and mental health) and their corresponding survey 
questions. 
[Insert Table 3.1 here] 
                                                 
27 K10 is developed by Kessler and Mroczek in 1992, and widely adopted to measure 
anxiety-depression spectrum mental distress (Kessler et al. (2002)). 
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Responses to these health-related questions could be highly correlated. 
For example, people who are depressed may also be likely to feel hopeless and 
worthless. Empirically, we find a high correlation among Depressed, Nervous, 
Restless, Hopeless, Difficult, and Worthless (the average correlation is 
0.6961), but there is a low correlation between these six variables and 
Forgetful (the average correlation is 0.1153). In the empirical analysis, we 
report the estimates for each of these health outcomes, as well as the average 
effect size (AES) indices for the two health categories (physical and mental 
health) following Kling et al. (2004). Specifically, let  ̂  be the estimated 
sent-down coefficient for the outcome variable  , and let   
  denote the 







   , where K is the total number of outcome variables for physical or 
mental health. Hence, we are drawing more general conclusions about the 




While our health outcomes are constructed based on self-reported 
responses, one could be concerned with the measurement error problem, 
especially when reporting errors are different across our treatment and control 
groups. Several threads of evidence suggest that this is less applicable to our 
setting. First, we essentially compare outcomes between two birth cohorts on 
the margin (i.e., cohort 1947 vs. cohort 1946). No prior theories posit why 
these two birth cohorts should report differently, especially since our 
                                                 
28 The AES index has two additional advantages over the individual estimates: First, while 
results regarding each single outcome variable could potentially be due to chance (Type I 
error), it is less likely for the AES index when several outcome variables are simultaneously 




construction of birth cohorts is based on grade (August versus September of 
the same year) rather than calendar year. Second, the CFPS is designed to 
“collect individual-, family-, and community-level longitudinal data in 
contemporary China”, 29  instead of specifically targeting the send-down 
experience. Hence, respondents should not be influenced by survey objectives 
in their replies to questions. Third, answers to the more factual questions 
suggest that measurement errors are limited. For example, to follow up on the 
main question under Chronic (“During the past six months, have you had any 
doctor-diagnosed chronic disease?”), there is a subquestion for the respondents 
who answered “yes”: “For each of two main chronic diseases, when was the 
chronic disease diagnosed by the doctor?” We check the correlation between 
the response to the subquestion (whether the respondent replied to the 
subquestion) and Chronic, and find a correlation of 0.9051. Given that the 
subquestion requires detailed information on chronic diseases, the high 
correlation reduces concern about the reporting errors. 
Send-down status. The CFPS contains information on whether the 
person experienced the send-down movement and his/her place of registered 
residence (hukou) at various ages. We use hukou status at the age of 12 to 
identify urban youths, assuming that during junior and senior high school the 
person was living in the region where he or she lived at 12. One concern is 
that people could have moved from urban to rural areas during that period, and 
thus avoided being sent down. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
government strictly regulated urban-to-rural migration, and hukou status could 
not be manipulated (Naughton 2006). 




Regression sample. In the empirical analysis, we restrict our analysis 
to individuals born between 1930 and 1958. This is because cohorts born 
before 1930 (i.e., citizens who were in their 80s when the survey was 
conducted) have very few observations in our data and could suffer from 
selection bias; those born from 1958 to 1961 experienced the three-year Great 
Famine (1958-1961) in China, which could also affect long-run health 
outcomes; and those born after 1961 were not eligible for the send-down 
movement.
30
 The remaining sample contains 11,810 individuals. Descriptive 
statistics for our sample are presented in Table 3.2. 
[Insert Table 3.2 here] 
Overall, our sample contains 1,477 send-down-eligible individuals 
(with urban hukou at age 12 and at least junior high school education), and 
10,333 send-down-ineligible individuals (with rural hukou at age 12 or urban 
hukou and education below high school).  The send-down ratio is 34.6% for 
eligible individuals and close to zero for ineligible individuals. Compared to 
their ineligible counterparts, eligible individuals on average have higher 
education attainment, higher birth weight, fewer siblings, more educated 
parents, and are less likely to belong to an ethnic minority, less likely to be 
separated from parents between age 0 and 12, and less likely to have migrated 
between age 0 and 12. Eligible and ineligible samples are similar in gender 
composition and family background during the Cultural Revolution. An 
average eligible individual in the survey was more likely to have chronic 
diseases and less likely to have abnormal BMI values, be hospitalized, or feel 
                                                 
30 As the send-down movement was officially terminated in 1978, the last cohort subject to 
the movement is then cohort 1961. 
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uncomfortable. Meanwhile, raw comparison of the means suggests that 
send-down-eligible people seem to have better mental health status. 
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Potential Manipulation 
The key identifying assumption of our RD-DD estimations is that  [       
 ] is continuous in c at   ; in other words, people cannot fully manipulate the 
assignment variable, i.e., the timing of births. 
Before testing the validity of our identification strategy, let us first 
point out that our estimation framework allows for a certain degree of 
manipulation within cohorts. That is, within the send-down-eligible cohorts, 
the selection of being sent down is allowed. For instance, middle school 
students with poor health could avoid being sent down, and our identification 
strategy allows for such selection. The rationale is similar to the case of 
randomized controlled trials (RCT) with some compliers and some 
noncompliers. Within the treatment group, people can choose to participate 
(compliers) or not (noncompliers). But as long as there is randomization 
across treatment and control groups, comparison of outcomes between the 
whole treatment and whole control groups can identify the intention- to-treat 
effect (ITT). Meanwhile, using randomization to instrument for the real status 
of treatment can identify the treatment-on-treated effect (TOT), the strategy 
used here. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that our identifying assumption is 
satisfied. First, the cohorts on the margin are people born in 1945-1947, the 
period of the Chinese Civil War (the battle between the Kuomintang and the 
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Communist Party). No one at that time could predict that the Chinese 
Communist Party would win the war in 1949 and establish a new government, 
nor that roughly 20 years later, Mao would launch a large-scale send-down 
movement. Indeed, it is well documented that the mandatory policy came as a 
shock to most people (Bernstein 1977; Li et al. 2010). Second, it is difficult to 
manipulate the timing of childbirth, as cesarean sections were not widely 
available at the time. Further, notice that our assignment variable, birth cohort, 
is based on the school opening month. There was no fixed date for school 
opening in the 1930s-1940s in China; hence, it is unlikely that people would 
manipulate the birth months of their children to let them enter school earlier or 
later. 
To further support our identifying assumption, we provide two sets of 
quantitative analyses suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010). First, if there is 
no strategic timing of birth, we will not find discontinuity in the density of the 
birth cohort at the cutoff point (cohort 1947). Figure 3.1 reports the histogram 
of the birth cohort; clearly, there is no discontinuity at cohort 1947 (the cutoff 
point) in either the urban or rural population. 
[Insert Figure 3.1 here] 
However, a concern about this density check is that our data come 
from a survey conducted in 2010, when the relevant cohorts were in their 60s. 
If the probability of surviving to 2010 is affected by the send-down experience 
and changes discontinuously at the cutoff point, it might be possible that this 
differential mortality rate cancels out the manipulation of childbirth timing, so 
we do not find any discontinuity in the observed density of birth cohort in 
Figure 3.1. To check this possibility, we report in Appendix Figures A1-A3 
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the histogram of birth cohorts using China’s population censuses in 1982,31 
1990, and 2000 when the cohorts on the margin were respectively, in their 30s, 
40s, and 50s—when the cohorts on the margin were, respectively, in their 30s, 
40s, and 50s—ages at which the mortality rate is relatively low. It is clear that 
none of these figures finds any discontinuity at cohort 1947. Combined, these 
results suggest that there is no sample selection issue due to differential 
mortality rates across cohorts on the margin and no evidence for the 
manipulation of birth timing. 
A second check for the validity of our research setting is to examine 
whether individuals’ predetermined socioeconomic characteristics are smooth 
at the cutoff point. Specifically, we examine the number of siblings, gender, 
ethnic group, low birth weight (birth weight <2500 gm), parents’ education, 
parents’ age at birth, weeks separated from parents from age 0 to 12, ever 
migrated from age 0 to 12, and family background during Cultural Revolution 
(i.e., revolutionary class, middle class, class enemies, or other class). Figures 
2A-2C plot the differences in these socioeconomic variables between 
treatment (urban high school or above graduates after September 1946) and 
control cohorts (urban high school or above graduates born before September 
1946), as well as the 95% confidence intervals against different window 
lengths. As shown in these figures, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
mean differences for these socioeconomic characteristics between treatment 
and control groups are zero at the 95% confidence interval up to a window of 
seven cohorts. 
[Insert Figures 3.2A-3.2C here] 
                                                 
31 The 1982 population census does not include the information necessary to break the 
population into rural and urban; hence, we draw the histogram for the whole population. 
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We then test whether our treatment and control groups are balanced 
among all these socioeconomic characteristics within the seven cohorts 
window in Table 3.3. Columns 1 and 4 report mean values for these 
socioeconomic characteristics for the seven control and seven treatment 
cohorts, while Columns 2 and 5 present standard deviations. Columns 7 and 8 
report mean differences and p-values. Clearly, all these predetermined 
socioeconomic characteristics are balanced between treatment and control 
groups. Accordingly, in the regression analysis, we also present results based 
on this narrow window of seven cohorts on each side of the cutoff point (i.e., 
cohorts 1940-1953), as well as those based on the full window (cohorts 
1930-1958). 
[Insert Table 3.3 here] 
 
3.4.2 Send-Down Probability and Birth Cohorts 
We first present (Figure 3.3) the relation between send-down status 
(our regressor of interest) and birth cohort (our assignment variable) for 
send-down-eligible (urban junior high school or above graduates)  and 
ineligible groups (urban below high school graduates and rural residents) 
separately. Clearly, there is a jump in the probability of being sent down at the 
cutoff cohort (i.e., cohort 1947) among the send-down-eligible group. In 
contrast, among the send-down-ineligible group, the probability of being sent 
down always remains close to zero. 
[Insert Figure 3.3 here] 
Table 3.4 reports the first-stage results—the effect of being born after 
September 1946 on send-down participation—using the RD-DD estimation. 
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We use two regression samples:  a full sample consisting cohorts 1930-1958 
and a restricted sample of seven cohorts on each side of the cutoff cohort (i.e., 
cohorts 1940-1953). Meanwhile, we use various polynomial functions to 
control for the direct effect of birth cohort. Table 3.4 presents four 
specifications: Row 1 reports results using the full sample and cubic 
polynomial function of cohorts without varying slopes across the cutoff 
cohort; Row 2 reports results from the full sample and quadratic function with 
varying slopes across the cutoff; Row 3 uses the restricted sample and 
quadratic function without varying slopes; Row 4 uses the restricted sample 
and linear function with varying slopes. We also report the point estimate and 
bootstrapping standard errors. 
We find that mandatory enforcement significantly increased the 
probability of being sent down, consistent with the pattern shown in Figure 3. 
The magnitude is about 0.203 to 0.257, the exact number depends on 
regression sample and choice of polynomial control function. The effect is 
enormous considering the fact that the average send-down probability for the 
eligible group is 0.34. 
[Insert Table 3.4 here] 
In summary, our results show that there is a discontinuity of being sent 
down for cohorts on the margin; the policy change in 1968 increased the 
probability of being sent down by 20%-26%. Therefore, this confirms the 






3.4.3 Physical Health 
We first present the relation between physical health conditions and birth 
cohorts in Figure 3.4. For the send-down-ineligible group, we do not find 
visible discontinuities at the cutoff cohort among all four physical health 
outcomes. For the send-down-eligible group, at the cutoff cohort there is no 
clear discontinuity for Abnormal BMI (underweight or overweight) and 
Hospitalized (being hospitalized within a year due to illness or injury). There 
is sizable jump, however, in Chronic (any doctor-diagnosed chronic diseases 
in the past six months) and a modest drop in Uncomfortable (feeling 
physically uncomfortable in the past two weeks) at the cutoff cohort. 
[Insert Figure 3.4 here] 
Table 3.5 reports the RD-DD estimators corresponding to Equation 
(3.5) with four different specifications. Each column, from Column 1 to 
Column 4, reports the results for a health indicator. Each row corresponds to a 
specification. We find consistent estimates across all the regression 
specifications: (1) no significant effects of the send-down experience on 
Abnormal BMI, Hospitalization, or Uncomfortable, and in some specifications 
the estimates are close to zero; and (2) a positive effect of the send-down 
experience on Chronic, with estimates ranging from 0.448 to 0.802. Overall, 
the results for physical health indicators are in line with the observation in 
Figure 3.4. 
[Insert Table 3.5 here] 
To capture the overall effect on physical health, in Column 5 we report 
the AES index, which is the weighted average of the four individual health 
estimates. This is insignificant and small in magnitude in some specifications, 
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suggesting a limited overall effect of the send-down experience on long-term 
physical health. 
 
3.4.4 Mental Health 
For the send-down effect on mental health, we found consistently adverse 
impacts across all seven indicators. Figures 3.5a-3.5b show the relation 
between mental health status and birth cohort. We find that for the 
send-down-ineligible group, there is no clear discontinuity at the cutoff cohort 
for any of the seven measures of mental health, whereas for the send- 
down-eligible group, there is a visible jump at the cutoff cohort for all seven 
mental health outcomes. These results suggest that the send-down experience 
has a negative effect on individuals’ long-term mental health. 
[Insert Figures 3.5a-3.5b here] 
To corroborate the message in Figures 3.5a-3.5b, we report the RD-DD 
estimators corresponding to Equation (3.5) in columns 1-7 of Table 3.6 for the 
seven measures of mental health. Across all four regression specifications, we 
consistently find positive effects of the send-down experience on all seven 
measures of mental health, and most of these estimates are statistically 
significant. By definition, higher values of these measures mean worse mental 
health status; therefore, the estimates suggest that the send-down experience 
leads to more severe mental disorders or worse mental health status in general. 
[Insert Table 3.6 here] 
In column 8 of Table 3.6 we report the AES index, which captures the 
overall effect on long-term mental health. The AES index is positive and 
statistically significant for all four regression specifications, suggesting that 
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the adverse effects of the send-down are not due to any particular measure of 
mental health status. 
To better appreciate these estimates, we compare them to health 
impacts from other early-life interventions. Our results show that the 
send-down experience increases mental problems by 0.9-1.9 percentage 
points, which is about 1.57-3.32 standard deviations, or 62.6% to 132.1% of 
the mean. These effects strike us in terms of magnitude compared to previous 
studies. For instance, Fenske et al. (2014) found that a one standard deviation 
rise in the price of cocoa (a main source of income fluctuation) at the time of 
birth decreases the likelihood of severe mental distress in adulthood by 3 
percentage points, or half the mean prevalence. One possible explanation for 
our relatively large effect is that compared to changes due to a better 
environment or better economic circumstances, the shock from the send-down 
experience was more severe. Another possibility is that adolescence and early 
adulthood is a period when mental status is more sensitive to shocks in the 
environment than during early childhood, which previous studies target. 
 
3.4.5 Robustness Checks 
In this subsection, we conduct robustness checks on our main findings, 
following the suggestions by Lee and Lemieux (2010). 
Including predetermined socioeconomic characteristics. Our 
RD-DD estimators require that cohorts on the margin (i.e., cohort 1947 vs. 
cohort 1946) be balanced along all dimensions except for facing mandatory 
send-down. If this identifying assumption was satisfied, including 
socioeconomic controls should have little effect on our estimator  ̂      for 
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both the statistical significance and estimated magnitude. As shown in Tables 
3.7a-3.7b, we find that the inclusion of controls (e.g., gender, ethnicity, 
number of siblings, and political identity of the family during the Cultural 
Revolution) barely changes our RD-DD estimators in either statistical 
significance or magnitude, implying the validity of our identification strategy. 
[Insert Tables 3.7a-3.7b here] 
Placebo test using different send-down ineligible groups. Note that 
there are two groups of send-down-ineligible individuals: urban individuals 
with primary schooling or below and rural residents. Because both groups 
were immune to the mandatory send-down movement, comparisons of them 
using the same estimation strategy as above should not produce any significant 
differences; otherwise, it would indicate the existence of some omitted 
variables. In Tables 3.8a and 3.8b, we report the RD-DD estimations, in which 
the treatment group is urban individuals born after 1947 with primary 
schooling or below, the control group is urban individuals born before 1947 
with primary schooling or below, and the sample of rural residents is used to 
subtract birth-cohort effects. We find that none of the RD-DD estimators is 
statistically significant. Meanwhile, these estimators are of much smaller 
magnitude than our baseline RD-DD estimators in Tables 3.5-3.6. Taken 
together, these findings imply that our research design is valid. 
[Insert Tables 3.8a-3.8b here] 
 
3.5 Mechanism 
In the previous section we documented a significant adverse effect of the 
send-down experience on long-term mental health, but only a limited effect on 
92 
 
long-term physical health. Because sent-down youths experienced a great deal 
of hardship during their send-down period, our findings suggest that adversity 
in adolescence and early adulthood  creates long-term mental health 
problems but has much less impact on the physical level. Several hypotheses 
may explain our findings. First, mental health problems developed during the 
send-down period and persisted to the late-life stage. Second, the send-down 
experience may have changed people’s post-movement life trajectory, which 
in turn affects their mental health. Meanwhile, due to the Cultural Revolution, 
cities were violent and chaotic, and therefore our findings may come from the 
change in mental health conditions in our control cohorts (i.e., cohort 1946), 
who stayed in cities. In this section, we check each of these alternative 
hypotheses to shed light on the underlying mechanisms of our findings. 
 
3.5.1 Health Conditions during the Send-Down Period 
The check on the hypothesis that mental health problems originated during the 
send-down period requires data on health conditions in the 1960s-1970s in 
China. However, the unavailability of such data prevents us from examining 
this hypothesis quantitatively. Instead, we look at anecdotal evidence 
documented by Chinese historians and sociologists to provide suggestive 
information on this hypothesis. 
As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, sent-down youths encountered 
difficulties in adapting to rural life. When they arrived in the countryside, they 
found that the reality was a long way from official propaganda, which 
described the countryside as a “vast expanse of heaven and earth where we 
can flourish.” To them, the villages did not offer an appropriate future, and 
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they felt deprived compared to their non-sent-down counterparts, who were 
enjoying the comforts of city life (Bernstein 1977). A young man from Beijing 
described their shock upon arriving in a village in Heilongjiang, Northeast 
China. 
We were in the same high school and rather pleased to be going off to 
live together among friends in a new place in the middle of the countryside. 
But when we arrived and discovered how filthy the peasants were, and the 
desolation and backwardness of that dump, and realized that we would have 
to spend the rest of our lives there, we felt a terrible anguish and as soon as 
we were left alone we burst into tears together. The girls especially, were 
sobbing loudly. (Bonnin and Horko, 2013, p.236) 
Sent-down youths were more likely to get sick or be injured due to the 
low standard of sanitation, extreme fatigue from labor and malnutrition. 
Harmful insects such as mosquitoes and whitmania pigra were widespread in 
the countryside and infected many youths with malaria. Hepatitis and rabies 
were endemic in some regions among the sent-down youths (Bonnin and 
Horko 2013). Certain tasks they performed in the field were high risk. For 
instance, long hours of working in the paddy field could lead to rheumatism 
and chronic arthritis. Many sent-down women suffered from abnormal 
menstruation due to living and working conditions. A 1972 survey shows that 
around 70% of the sent-down women had gynecological problems, as they 
were forced to carry out farm work during their menstrual periods (Gu, 2009, 
p. 103-104). 
In addition to being more likely to fall sick in the countryside than in 
the city, health care was far inferior in rural areas. In areas without proper 
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transportation, youths had to travel to health centers or ill-equipped hospitals 
miles away. Like the peasants, sent-down youths did not have insurance, and 
had to rely on the low wages they earned from farm work. 
At the level of mental health, the monotony of life and absence of any 
social or spiritual activities affected their morale and beliefs. During leisure 
time, well-educated youths were hungry for books and to write, which is 
common in the cities but difficult to do by the light of an oil lamp and without 
a table. The writer Wang Xiaobo described this feeling: 
The sent-down life was difficult, we did not eat to the full, we couldn’t 
get acclimated to the local environment, and many people fell sick. But the 
greatest pain was the lack of books.. . . I believe that I’m not alone. As the 
night drew closer, you sit under the roof, watch the sky get darker slowly, 
feeling immensely lonely and miserable, as if someone deprived  our lives. I 
was young at the time, but I was daunted by the idea that I had to live and 
grow old like that. I think this is more terrifying than death. (Li and Zheng, 
1999, p.22) 
 
3.5.2 The Cultural Revolution Effect 
The mandatory send-down movement occurred during the Cultural 
Revolution, which un-leashed great violence and chaos in cities but not in 
rural areas. It may be possible, therefore that our findings can be explained by 
the escape from violence and chaos in cities rather than by hardships in rural 
areas. However, given our finding that sent-down youths have worse 
long-term mental health status, this hypothesis essentially posits that city 
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violence improved long-term mental health for our control groups, which 
seems counterintuitive. 
Nonetheless, we further provide both anecdotal and analytical evidence 
to suggest that this is not the main reason. First, one widely held conjecture 
about why Mao launched the send-down movement on such a large scale is 
that the Red Guards (which consisted mostly of teenagers) became a 
destructive force in the cities (e.g., destroying schools and factories, harassing 
ordinary citizens, and engaging in robbery and other criminal behavior), and 
the send-down was intended to defuse the Red Guards and reduce violence 
and chaos. In other words, our treatment and control groups in the cities 
largely experienced a similar degree of violence and chaos; hence, city 
violence should not drive our results. 
Second, to provide some quantitative evidence, we divide our sample 
provinces into two groups according to their violence level during the Cultural 
Revolution: provinces with fierce violence and provinces with less violence.
32
 
As sent-down cohorts from different provinces were largely blended in the 
same rural areas, any differential estimates between these two groups would 
indicate the effect of city violence. Regression results are reported in Tables 
3.9a-3.9b. It is clear that all of our estimates are statistically similar between 
the fierce-violence group and the less-violence group and many differences are 
small in magnitude, implying that the effect of city violence does not explain 
our results. 
[Insert Tables 3.9a-3.9b here] 
                                                 
32 A province is classified as a fierce-violence province if at least two major violent events 
occurred between May 1966 and December 1968, and as a less-violence province otherwise. 
See the Memorabilia of the Red Guards (Jiang (1994)) for the information on major violent 
events during this period. 
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3.5.3 Post-Send-Down Life Outcomes 
The send-down experience may significantly affect people’s lives even after 
the send-down movement ended, causing later mental health problems. To 
check the feasibility of this hypothesis, we investigate the effect of send-down 
on education, labor market, and marriage outcomes. Specifically, we construct 
Years of Schooling to capture educational attainment, Total Income to capture 
the labor market outcome, and Being Single, Being Divorced, Age at First 
Marriage, Age at First Birth and Number of Children to capture the marriage 
outcome. 
Regression results from the same RD-DD specification as before are 
reported in Table 3.10. While we found that the send-down experience 
reduced educational attainment  and age at first marriage and increased total 
income, probability of being single, probability of getting divorced, age at first 
birth, and number of children, yet none of these estimates is statistically 
significant and most are small in magnitude. Combined, these results provide 
limited evidence that our findings can be explained by changes in education, 
labor market, or marriage outcomes caused by the send-down experience. 
[Insert Table 3.10 here] 
However, due to data limitations, we cannot exhaust all potentially 
important events that happened after the send-down movement. For example, 
when returning to cities, the send-down youths may have taken up different 
occupations or had difficulty fitting into the new environment. We admit this 
possibility, and therefore our hypothesis about post-send-down life should be 




3.6 Heterogeneous Effects 
We further investigate whether the effect of adolescent adversity on long-term 
health differs across individuals with different characteristics, and specifically, 
across gender and different numbers of siblings. 
 
3.6.1 Gender Difference 
Recent literature has uncovered substantial gender differences in economic 
outcomes such as risk preference (Catherine and Philip 2008), social 
preference (Brown-Kruse and Hummels 1993; Nowell and Tinkler 1994; 
Cadsby and Maynes 1998; Eckel and Grossman 1998; Andreoni and 
Vesterlund 2001) and attitudes toward competition (Gneezy et al. 2003; 
Niederle and Vesterlund 2007).
33
 If men and women cope with stress in 
different ways, there could be differences in send-down effects on health. 
Regression results for male and female samples and their estimate 
differences are reported in Tables 3.11a-3.11b. Interestingly, we find that 
females who experienced send-down are more likely to have chronic diseases 
than males, but are similar to males on other three measures of physical health. 
Meanwhile, there is no significant gender difference across all of the mental 
health outcomes. These results imply that females handle mental problems as 
well as males when facing hardships in their early adulthood lives. 
[Insert Tables 3.11a-3.11b here] 
 
3.6.2 Sibling Difference 
                                                 
33 For recent reviews on this literature, see Eckel and Grossman (2008); Croson and Gneezy 
(2009); Bertrand (2011); Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011). 
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Our main results show overall worse health for sent-down individuals. When a 
household has both sent-down and non-sent-down children, our findings 
reveal differences in skills and human capital across children after the 
send-down years, and parents may reinforce or compensate for such 
differences. On one hand, parents may behave “efficiently” and invest more in 
the non-sent-down child because he or she is healthier and will potentially 
have larger returns, thereby increasing the adverse effects on the health of the 
sent-down child. On the other hand, parents may want to compensate the 
sent-down child by allocating more health inputs to him or her after returning 
to the city, thereby reducing the gap between the sent-down and 
non-sent-down children. Studies have found evidence for both reinforcing and 
compensating investment (Li et al. 2010; Conti et al. 2010; Heckman et al. 
2013). 
Here, we explore how send-down effects differ across individuals with 
different numbers of siblings. In households with more siblings, resources are 
scarcer per person; this reduces magnitude for both reinforcing and 
compensating investment. If parents invest to make efficient returns, more 
siblings will reduce this effect and cause a smaller gap between sent-down and 
non-sent-down individuals. If, instead, parents invest to compensate the child 
experiencing difficulties, having more siblings will also reduce the effect and 
therefore lead to larger health effects from the send-down experience. 
Regression results for samples with more siblings and fewer siblings 
(defined as above and below the sample median) and their estimate differences 
are reported in Tables 3.12a-3.12b. We find that the effects are larger for the 
sample with fewer siblings than the sample with more siblings, for both 
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physical and mental health outcomes, and most of the mental health effects are 
statistically significant. These results suggest that the reinforcing investment 
mechanism is more in effect than the compensating investment mechanism in 
our setting. 
[Insert Tables 3.12a-3.12b here] 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This paper exploits a unique episode in which 17 million urban youths were 
exiled to rural China in the late 1960s and 1970s, following Mao’s sudden 
directive. Teenagers were uprooted from their urban lives, and lived in a harsh 
environment for years. We use this mandatory movement to estimate the effect 
of adversity in early life on long-term physical and mental outcomes. Our 
focus on long-term impacts lasting almost 40 years and the identification 
strategy from Regression Discontinuity are the paper’s main distinguishing 
features. 
Our findings show that youths who were rusticated—and thus lived in 
a less established environment—were more likely to develop chronic disease 
and mental disorders in their later life. It is worth noting that the estimated 
effect of the adversity in teen years is quite substantial. Spending many years 
in a backward environment led to a 44 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of chronic disease, and raised the level of mental distress by 1.57 to 
3.32 standard deviations, or 62%-132% from the mean. By comparison, Gould 
et al. (2011) examined the long-term social and economic effects of 
“Operation Magic Carpet,” in which Yemenite children were airlifted to Israel 
in 1949. They found that growing up in a city lowers the probability of 
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reporting a health problem by 6.2 percentage points, about 15.5% from the 
mean. In the Moving to Opportunity experiment, Kling et al. (2007) found that 
moving to less distressed neighborhoods led to a reduction in psychological 
distress (K6 z-score) by 0.2 standard deviations for adults and 0.5 standard 
deviations for female youth. The type of treatment that we analyze is not 
perfectly comparable to interventions that bring young people to modernized 
or better environments; adversity and benefit programs may not have 
symmetric effects on health, and the exact treatment is difficult to quantity. 
Nevertheless, taken together, we have a better understanding of the importance 
of adolescence and early adulthood, especially the long-lasting impacts on 
well-being. 
Our research also sheds light on a number of policy issues related to 
migration and welfare. Many developing countries have experienced a sharp 
increase in migration; in China’s case, mostly rural-to-urban migration. 
During the transition, migrant workers might have to leave their family and 
children behind in the countryside. In 2009, about 18 million children between 
14 and 18 were left behind by their migrant parents.
34
 Our results suggest that 
encouraging migrant workers to locate their teenager children in more 
established environments could have long-lasting effects. Policies and welfare 
systems for migrants should take into account factors that can affect migrants’ 
mobility, and how these effects are transmitted to the next generation. 
 




Figures and Tables for Chapter One 
 
Figure 1.1: Time Trends of Migrant Workers and Development of Telecom in China 
 
 
Sources: Second National Agricultural Census Key Data Bulletin (2008); Survey Monitoring Report of China’s Migrant Workers (2011); and Contemporary 



























































Note. The time in the x-axis represents the distance (in years) to the year of landline installation. 
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Table 1.1: Place and Timing of Landline phone Installation 
  [1] [2] [3] [4]   [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Dependent variable: Had landline phone in 1993 
 
Timing of landline phone installation 
          Average income per capita in 1991 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.013** 
 
-0.096*** -0.096*** -0.070** -0.059** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
 
(0.030) (0.034) (0.028) (0.025) 
Log population in 1991 0.296*** 0.310*** 0.329*** 0.388*** 
 
-1.312*** -1.397*** -1.213*** -1.481*** 
 
(0.077) (0.078) (0.091) (0.101) 
 
(0.366) (0.374) (0.451) (0.493) 
Being classified as a poor village in 1991(0/1) 
 
-0.201 -0.233 -0.289* 
  
0.869 1.101* 1.351* 
  
(0.155) (0.148) (0.168) 
  
(0.711) (0.624) (0.677) 
Being classified as a disadvantaged village in 
1991(0/1)  
0.097 0.248* 0.251* 
  
-0.671 -1.796** -1.941** 
  
(0.140) (0.125) (0.134) 
  
(0.699) (0.697) (0.736) 
Percentage of arable land in 1991 
  
-0.097 -0.156 
   
0.639 0.617 
   
(0.203) (0.220) 
   
(0.900) (0.842) 
Mountains area (0/1) 
  
-0.161 -0.238 
   
1.423* 1.829** 
   
(0.137) (0.155) 
   
(0.779) (0.815) 
Distance to the nearest county/city (km) 
  
-0.009*** -0.009*** 
   
0.042** 0.040** 
   
(0.003) (0.003) 
   
(0.016) (0.015) 
Distance to the main road (km) 
  
0.030 0.031 
   
-0.034 -0.037 
   
(0.019) (0.021) 
   
(0.142) (0.149) 
Out-county migrant workers / Total labor force in 
1991    
-0.217 
    
-2.975 
    
(1.074) 
    
(4.483) 
Idle labors / Total labor force in 1991 
   
0.017 
    
-0.287 
    
(0.035) 
    
(0.196) 
Remittance income / Total income in 1991 
   
-1.415 
    
9.111 
    
(1.198) 
    
(5.994) 
Credit income / Total income in 1991 
   
-1.444 
    
6.565 
    
(0.921) 
    
(3.911) 
Observations 59 59 59 59 
 
59 59 59 59 
R-squared 0.288 0.312 0.426 0.459   0.234 0.259 0.394 0.440 
       Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at village level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics 
 
  Mean S.D. # Obs 
A. Proportion of migrant workers in total rural labor force 
Out-province 0.039 0.066 422 
Out-village, within-county 0.052 0.073 422 
    B. Village characteristics 
Average income per capita (Yuan) 2075.910 1353.469 422 
No. of households 479.401 356.767 422 
Land area (Km2) 7.172 10.970 422 
Total population 1895.962 1289.815 422 
Arable land area/total land area 0.516 0.333 422 
Proportion of villages located in mountain areas 0.318 0.466 422 
Proportion of villages classified as "Poor Village"  0.104 0.306 422 
Proportion of villages classified as in " Disadvantaged Areas" in 1991 0.305 0.464 59 
No. of newspapers per household 0.230 0.263 422 
No. of TV sets per household 0.808 0.235 422 
No. of children aged 7-13/labor force 0.544 0.233 422 
    
C. Distance between villages (km) 
Distance to the nearest county/municipal/prefecture government 23.319 18.817 422 
Distance to the main road 1.775 2.739 422 




Table 1.3: Summary Statistics on Landline phone Availability 
  
A. Landline telephone availability by year 




    
35 
    1995 
    
37 
    1996 
    
43 
    1997 
    
50 
    1998 
    
53 
    1999 
    
56 
    2000 
    
58 
















































 C. Number of villages with new access 
Year 
 




































Table 1.4: Baseline Results 
Dependent variable [1] [2] [3] 
Regressors: Ratio of out-province migrant workers 
Panel A: Full Sample 
   Tele 0.020** 0.020** 0.021** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
    Year fixed effect Y Y Y 
Village fixed effect Y Y Y 
Time polynomial interactions with: 
   Determinant variables in 1991 N Y Y 
Control variables in 1993 N N Y 
Observations 422 411 411 
R-squared 0.067 0.152 0.176 
Number of villages 61 59 59 
    
Panel B: Sample of Switchers 
   Tele 0.015* 0.016*** 0.018*** 
 
(0.009) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Year fixed effect Y Y Y 
Village fixed effect Y Y Y 
Time polynomial interactions with: 
   Determinant variables in 1991 N Y Y 
Control variables in 1993 N N Y 
Observations 160 160 160 
R-squared 0.769 0.835 0.862 
Number of villages 23 23 23 
 
 
Notes: 1. Determinant variables in 1991 include average income per capita, log 
population, being classified as disadvantaged areas, being classified as poor village, 
distance to the nearest county or municipal (or prefecture) government, being in 
mountains areas;  
2. Other control variables in 1993 include sex ratio, ratio of electrified household, 
ratio of non-labor force, no. of firms in the village, newspaper per household, and TV 
sets per household;  
3. In column [1]-[3], standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level; 
whereas in column [4]-[6], standard errors in parentheses are calculated using the 
Wild cluster-bootstrap percentile-t procedure developed by Cameron, Gelbach, and 





Table 1.5: Robustness Checks 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 






       Tele 0.023*** 0.014** 
 




(0.011) (0.007) (0.010) 
Tele next year -0.003 
     
 
(0.004) 
     2 years before installation 
  
0.011 
   
   
(0.015) 
   1 year before installation 
  
0.008 
   
   
(0.011) 
   time of installation 
  
0.024* 
   
   
(0.014) 
   1 year after installation 
  
0.034** 
   
   
(0.016) 
   2 years + after installation 
  
0.043 
   
   
(0.029) 
   
       Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Village fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time polynomial interactions with: 
     
Determinant variables in 1991 Y Y Y Y Y N 
Control variables in 1993 Y Y Y Y Y N 
Province time dummies 
 
Y 
           
F test for treatment × {time 0, 
  
3.73** 
   post1, post2+} 
  
0.017  
   
       Observations 411 411 376 411 411 170 
R-squared 0.176 0.309 0.243 0.138 0.176 0.238 
Number of villages 59 59 54 59 59 51 
 
Notes: 1. Determinant variables in 1991 include average income per capita, log 
population, being classified as disadvantaged areas, being classified as poor village, 
distance to the nearest county or municipal (or prefecture) government, being in 
mountains areas;  
2. Other control variables in 1993 include sex ratio, ratio of electrified household, 
ratio of non-labor force, no. of firms in the village, newspaper per household, and TV 
sets per household.  




Table 1.6: Mechanisms 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Dependent variable Ratio of out-province migrant workers 
Tele -0.010 -0.027 -0.045* -0.226* 
 
(0.010) (0.024) (0.027) (0.134) 














Tele × Ratio of children (7-13)  in previous year 
 
0.149 0.151 0.331 
  
(0.100) (0.093) (0.204) 
children (7-13)  / labor force in previous year 
 
-0.055 -0.123 -0.216 
  
(0.104) (0.094) (0.165) 
     Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Village fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Time polynomial interactions with: 
    Determinant variables in 1991 Y Y Y Y 
Control variables in 1993 Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 292 292 292 292 
R-squared 0.415 0.130 0.425 0.425 
Number of villages 59 59 59 59 
 
Notes: 1. Determinant variables in 1991 include average income per capita, log 
population, being classified as disadvantaged areas, being classified as poor village, 
distance to the nearest county or municipal (or prefecture) government, being in 
mountains areas; 
2. Other control variables in 1993 include sex ratio, ratio of electrified household, 
ratio of non-labor force, no. of firms in the village, newspaper per household, and TV 
sets per household. 
3. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at village level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. 
111 
 
Figures and Tables for Chapter Two 
 
Figure 2.1: Distribution of Birth Cohort by Hukou Status at Age 12 
 
Notes: This figure plots the density of birth cohort in the sample. The upper panel shows individuals with Urban Hukou at the age of 12 and the lower panel 
shows individuals with Rural Hukou at the age of 12.
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Figure 2.2A: Difference between Send-down-eligible and Send-down-ineligible Cohorts with Various Windows: Family Characteristics and 
Ethnicity 
 
Note: Figures show differences in predetermined characteristics between send-down-eligible and send-down-ineligible cohorts. In each graph, the horizontal 
axis is the window around the cutoff cohort (birth cohort 1947). For instance, points corresponding to window 7 are calculated differences between cohorts 
1947-1953 (send-down eligible) and cohorts 1940-1946 (send-down ineligible).
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Figure 2.2B: Difference between Send-down-eligible and Send-down-ineligible Cohorts with Various Windows: Political Identity during 
Cultural Revolution 
 
Note: Figures show differences in predetermined characteristics between the send-down-eligible and send-down-ineligible cohorts. In each graph, the 
horizontal axis is the window around the cutoff cohort (birth cohort 1947). For instance, points corresponding to window 7 are calculated differences between 
cohorts 1947-1953 (send-down eligible) and cohorts 1940-1946 (send-down ineligible).
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Note: This figure shows the discontinuity in the send-down probability at birth cohort 1947 among urban individuals. Circles and triangles represent 




Table 2.1 Mean Comparison for Other Covariates 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 
 Had Urban Hukou at age 12 
 
1940-1946 cohorts 1947-1953 cohorts 
 
Ho: diff=0 
Outcome Mean # Obs Mean # Obs Difference P-value 
Family background during Cultural Revolution: 
     






























































Mother's education (years) 1.773  22  2.408  125  -0.635  0.489  
  (3.023)   (4.094)       
Notes: 1. Data include 1940-1953 cohorts who had urban Hukou status at age 12. 
2. Urban observations with below junior high school education levels are excluded from the sample. 
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Table 2.2 Outcome Variables and Corresponding Survey Questions 
 
Category Variable  Survey Question 
Family and Relationships 
Companionship (1) How important to you is not being lonely? 
Spouse (2) How important to you is a loving relationship with your spouse? 
Children (3) How important to you is your children being successful? 
Popularity (4) How important to you is not being disliked by others? 
      
Success 
Achievement (5) How important to you is feeling successful? 
Wealth (6) How much do you agree with the following statement: "Wealth reflects an individual's 
achievements"? 
Luck (7) To what extent do you agree with the following statement about the factors that affect people's 
success: "The most important factor affecting one's future success is his/her luck." 
Ability-connection (8) How much do you agree with the following statement: "In today's society, having social 
connections is more important than having individual capabilities"? 
      
Growing or Egalitarian 
Society 





Table 2.3: Summary Statistics (1930-1992 Cohorts) 
 
  Urban Hukou at age 12   Rural Hukou at age 12 
Total number of observations   5255    
 
  26564    
 
Mean S.D. #Obs 
 
Mean S.D. #Obs 
Send-down 0.124  0.330  5255  
 
0.006  0.077  26564  
Value toward Family and relationship 
       Companionship 4.194  0.964  5258  
 
3.986  1.032  26577  
Spouse 4.350  0.998  5258  
 
4.222  1.006  26577  
Children 4.489  0.883  5258  
 
4.579  0.764  26577  
Popularity 4.145  0.952  5258  
 
3.913  1.056  26577  
Value toward success 
       Achievement 3.795  1.086  5258  
 
3.663  1.104  26577  
Wealth 3.241  1.042  5123  
 
3.486  0.939  23191  
Luck 3.214  1.004  5211  
 
3.193  1.000  24690  
Ability-connection 3.659  0.962  5171  
 
3.546  0.962  24094  
Value toward egalitarian Society 
       Inequality 2.565  1.050  5027  
 
3.002  1.074  21627  
Other variables: 
       Education (years) 10.502  4.028  5252  
 
5.445  4.733  26583  
Family background during Cultural Revolution: 
 
3844  
   
20672  






























Number of siblings 2.246  1.935  5151  
 
3.030  1.902  26298  
Gender (male=1) 0.492  0.500  5259  
 
0.484  0.500  26585  
Ethnic minority 0.043  0.203  5250  
 
0.089  0.285  26523  
Father's education (years) 8.512  4.628  2425  
 
4.779  4.340  10715  
























Table 2.4 Baseline Results 
Table 2.4 Panel A. First Stage Results 
 
First stage RDD   RD-DD 
  I (cohort>1946) # obs 
 
Urban×Cohorts 47-61 # obs 
        
 
 










          R squared 0.15  




Weak Instrument Test 
      
  


















20% maximal IV size 6.66  







Table 2.4 Panel B. RDD and RD-DD Estimates 
 
    RDD   RD-DD   Reduce form   Test 














Dependent variables- Mean & SD Send-down # obs 
 
Send-down # obs 
 
Cohorts 47-61 # obs 
 
χ2 Prob. > χ2 
Family and relationship 
            




0.128*** 31,113  
2.07 0.1506 






   




0.150*** 31,113  
0.18 0.6718 






   




0.203*** 31,113  
0.38 0.539 






   




0.113*** 31,113  
0.85 0.3554 















   
    (0.463)     (0.077)               
 
Notes: 1. RD regressions include 1940-1953 urban cohorts; RD-DD regressions include 1930-1992 cohorts; 
2. RD regressions are clustered by cohort levels, see Lee and Card (2008), and include first order piecewise control functions; 
3. RD-DD regressions include cohort dummies and Hukou dummies. Standard errors are clustered at cohort level; 






Table 2.5 Baseline Results (Cont.) 
 
Table 2.5 Panel A. First Stage Results 
 
First stage RDD (40-53 cohorts)   RD-DD (30-92 cohorts) 
  I (cohort>1946) # obs 
 
Urban×Cohorts 47-61 # obs 

















          R squared 0.15  




Weak Instrument Test 
      
  


















20% maximal IV size 6.66  
















Table 2.5 Panel B. RDD and RD-DD Estimates 
 
















Dependent variables- Mean Send-down # obs 
 
Send-down # obs 
 
Cohorts 47-61 # obs 
 




          














   














   














   




















   






    
   
Growing or Egalitarian Society 
         
   







  (1.08) (0.453)     (0.095)     (0.042)         
 
Notes: 1. RD regressions include 1940-1953 urban cohorts; RD-DD regressions include 1930-1992 cohorts; 
2. RD regressions are clustered by cohort levels, see Lee and Card (2008), and include first order piecewise control functions; 
3. RD-DD regressions include cohort dummies and Hukou dummies; Standard errors are clustered at cohort level; 
4. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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& SD  
Send-down # obs 
 
Send-down # obs 
 
Send-down # obs 
 
Send-down # obs 
Family and relationship 
           























































































               
Success 



























































































 Growing or Egalitarian Society 
  


















 Control for predetermined characteristics Y 
          Drop Famine cohorts (1959-1961) 
 
   
Y 
       Control for health condition 
  
      
Y 
    Use urban primary school or below as treatment group 
        
Y 
  
Notes: 1. All RD-DD regressions include 1930-1992 cohorts; 
2. RD-DD regressions include cohort dummies and Hukou dummies; Standard errors are clustered at cohort level; 














Table 2.7: Heterogeneous Effects for People that Went to Poorer Rural Places 
 




  Dependent variables- Send-down income ratio income ratio # obs 
Family and relationship 
    
Companionship 0.537* 0.027 -0.195 31,058 
 (0.325) (0.037) (0.131) 
 Spouse 0.729** 0.044 -0.309** 31,058 
 (0.358) (0.037) (0.154) 
 Children 0.999** 0.066** -0.435** 31,058 
 (0.398) (0.028) (0.176) 
 Popularity -0.051 0.093*** -0.056 31,058 
 (0.399) (0.030) (0.150) 
 AES 0.619*** 0.061*** -0.277*** 31,058 
 (0.229) (0.019) (0.092) 
 Success 
    Achievement -0.832** -0.057 0.355** 24,758 
 (0.380) (0.045) (0.151) 
 Wealth -1.089*** 0.042 0.349** 24,758 
 (0.353) (0.038) (0.139) 
 Luck -0.985*** 0.009 0.408*** 24,758 
 (0.282) (0.036) (0.115) 
 Ability-connection -0.363 -0.060* 0.215** 24,758 
 (0.270) (0.032) (0.104) 
 AES -0.810*** -0.016 0.328*** 24,758 
 (0.169) (0.019) (0.065) 
 
 
    Growing or Egalitarian Society -0.562* -0.088*** 0.210** 24,758 
 (0.288) (0.033) (0.106) 
   
     
Notes: 1. All regressions include cohort and Hukou dummies; Standard errors are 
clustered at cohort level; 













Table 2.8: Send-down and Education Attainment 
 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Outcome Mean & SD Send-down # obs 
Send-down's effect on Education 
   
Education level (years) 6.360 1.602** 31,109 
 
(5.000) (0.752) 
 Dependent variables- 
  
 Family and relationship 
  
 Companionship 3.98 0.282** 31,104 
 (1.04) (0.116) 
 Spouse 4.22 0.349*** 31,104 
 (1.01) (0.098) 
 Children 4.58 0.520*** 31,104 
 (0.77) (0.117) 
 Popularity 3.91 0.254*** 31,104 
 (1.06) (0.079) 
 AES 
 0.382*** 31,104 
  (0.072) 
 
  
  Success 3.73 -0.440*** 24,801 
Achievement (1.08) (0.131) 
 
 3.47 -0.245** 24,801 
Wealth (0.95) (0.098) 
 
 3.16 -0.205** 24,801 
Luck (1.01) (0.094) 
 
 3.54 -0.215** 24,801 
Ability-connection (0.98) (0.108) 
 
  
  AES 
 -0.271*** 24,801 
  (0.050) 
 
  
  Growing or Egalitarian Society 2.99 -0.529*** 24,801 
Inequality (1.08) (0.086) 
   
   
 
Notes: 1. All regressions include cohort and Hukou dummies; Standard errors are 
clustered at cohort level; 






















Less violence  
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
 & SD 
 
Send-down # obs 
 
Send-down # obs 
 
χ2 Prob. > χ2 
Family and 
relationship  
      
   




0.353 13,304  







   




0.278 13,304  







   




0.533** 13,304  







   




0.350 13,304  



















   
Success 
          




-0.569*** 10,288  







   











   




-0.233 10,288  







   
Ability- 




-0.704*** 10,288  




















   
Growing or 
Egalitarian 






0.000  0.982  
  (1.08)   (0.109)     (0.196)         
 
Notes: 1. All regressions include cohort and Hukou dummies; Standard errors are 
clustered at cohort level; 
2. Violent provinces include Beijing, Shanghai, Shaanxi, Zhejiang, Chongqing, Hubei, 
Hunan, Tianjin, Heilongjiang, Hebei, Shandong, Guizhou, Liaoning, Anhui, Qinghai 
and Henan; 











Table 2.10: Disciplined Responses and Behaviors 
 




Send-down # obs 
Subjective measures: 
   




Overall evaluation of the local government 3.659 0.072 28,788 
(1-worse than before; 5-big achievement) (0.880) (0.067) 
 
    
Objective behaviors: 
   





























Notes: 1. All regressions include cohort and Hukou dummies; Standard errors are 
clustered at cohort level; 






















Table 2.11: Heterogeneous Effects 
 
    Send-down×     
Dependent variables- Send-down Male Male # obs 
Family and relationship-AES 0.355*** 0.049 0.020** 31,113 
 (0.086) (0.030) (0.010) 
 Success-AES -0.221*** -0.049 0.006 24,810 
 (0.068) (0.036) (0.010) 
 Growing or Egalitarian Society -0.667*** 0.073 -0.035** 24,810 
  (0.121) (0.055) (0.016)   
 
 
Send-down× No. of 
 
Dependent variables- Send-down 
No. of 
siblings 
siblings # obs 
Family and relationship-AES 0.532*** -0.016* 0.006** 30,748 
 (0.118) (0.009) (0.003) 
 Success-AES -0.369*** 0.011 -0.002 24,539 
 (0.098) (0.011) (0.002) 
 Growing or Egalitarian Society -0.978*** 0.046** 0.020*** 24,539 




  Dependent variables- Send-down Minority Minority # obs 
Family and relationship-AES 0.392*** 0.345*** -0.126*** 31,045 
 (0.078) (0.075) (0.015) 
 Success-AES -0.283*** -0.021 -0.017 24,775 
 (0.050) (0.127) (0.013) 
 Growing or Egalitarian Society -0.557*** -0.172 0.043 24,775 






























 Dependent variables- Send-down Father's education Education # obs 
Family and relationship-AES 0.632*** -0.014** 0.008*** 13,004 
 (0.135) (0.007) (0.001) 
 Success-AES -0.449** 0.001 -0.003** 11,386 
 (0.187) (0.006) (0.001) 
 Growing or Egalitarian Society -0.681*** 0.022*** -0.017*** 11,386 




 Dependent variables- Send-down Mother's education Education # obs 
Family and relationship-AES 0.538*** -0.008 0.007*** 16,095 
 (0.089) (0.006) (0.002) 
 Success-AES -0.350*** 0.003 0.001 13,805 
 (0.076) (0.005) (0.002) 
 Growing or Egalitarian Society -0.794*** 0.020 -0.017*** 13,805 
  (0.191) (0.013) (0.002)   
 
Notes: 1. All regressions include cohort and Hukou dummies; Standard errors are 
clustered at cohort level; 































Send-down× Send-down× Send-down× Revolutionary Middle Class 
 
Dependent variables- Send-down 
Revolutionary 
Class 
Middle class Class enemies Class class enemies # obs 
Family and relationship 
        
AES 0.501 -0.073 -0.175 -0.134 0.165** 0.151** 0.171** 23,863 
 (0.324) (0.114) (0.108) (0.159) (0.068) (0.066) (0.076) 
 Success 
        AES 0.202 -0.147 -0.147 -0.164 0.157** 0.132** 0.185*** 18,231 
 (0.304) (0.115) (0.131) (0.147) (0.061) (0.063) (0.064) 
 Growing or Egalitarian 
Society 
        
 -0.834 0.169 0.180 0.112 0.152 0.101 0.256** 18,231 
  (0.598) (0.227) (0.252) (0.289) (0.105) (0.104) (0.105)   
 
Notes: 1. All regressions include cohort and Hukou dummies; Standard errors are clustered at cohort level; 











Figures and Tables for Chapter Three 
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Birth Cohort by Hukou Status at Age 12 
 
Notes: This figure plots the density of birth cohort in the sample. The upper panel shows individuals with Urban Hukou at the age of 12 and the lower panel 
shows individuals with Rural Hukou at the age of 12.
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Figure 3.2A: Difference between Send-down-eligible and Send-down-ineligible Cohorts with Various Windows: Family Characteristics and 
ethnicity 
 
Note: Figures show differences in predetermined characteristics between send-down-eligible and send-down-ineligible cohorts. In each graph, the horizontal 
axis is the window around the cutoff cohort (birth cohort 1947). For instance, points corresponding to window 7 are calculated differences between cohorts 
1947-1953 (send-down eligible) and cohorts 1940-1946 (send-down ineligible).
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Figure 3.2B: Difference between Send-down-eligible and Send-down-ineligible Cohorts with Various Windows: Family Characteristics and 
Early Experience 
  
Note: Figures show differences in predetermined characteristics between send-down-eligible and send-down-ineligible cohorts. In each graph, the horizontal 
axis is the window around the cutoff cohort (birth cohort 1947). For instance, points corresponding to window 7 are calculated differences between cohorts 
1947-1953 (send-down eligible) and cohorts 1940-1946 (send-down ineligible).
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Figure 3.2C: Difference between Send-down-eligible and Send-down-ineligible Cohorts with Various Windows: Political Identity during 
Cultural Revolution 
 
Note: Figures show differences in predetermined characteristics between send-down-eligible and send-down-ineligible cohorts. In each graph, the horizontal 
axis is the window around the cutoff cohort (birth cohort 1947). For instance, points corresponding to window 7 are calculated differences between cohorts 
1947-1953 (send-down eligible) and cohorts 1940-1946 (send-down ineligible).
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Figure 3.3: Cohort Means of Send-down: Send-down Eligible vs. Send-down Ineligible  
 
 
Note: This figure shows the discontinuity in the send-down probability at the cutoff birth cohort 1947 among send-down-eligible cohorts. Circles and 
triangles represent send-down probability for each cohort, and the lines show fitted values from flexible quadratic regression. 
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Figure 3.4: Estimated Discontinuities at Cohort Cutoff 1947 in Physical Health: Send-down Eligible vs. Send-down Ineligible 
 
Note: Figures show the estimated discontinuities in four physical health measures at the cutoff birth cohort 1947 among send-down-eligible cohorts and 




Figure 3.5A: Estimated Discontinuities at Cohort Cutoff 1947 in Mental Health: Send-down Eligible vs. Send-down Ineligible 
 
Note: Figures show the estimated discontinuities in four mental health measures at the cutoff birth cohort 1947 among send-down-eligible cohorts and 




Figure 3.5B: Estimated Discontinuities at Cohort Cutoff 1947 in Mental Health: Send-down Eligible vs. Send-down Ineligible 
 
Note: Figures show the estimated discontinuities in three mental health measures at the cutoff birth cohort 1947 among send-down-eligible cohorts and 





Table 3.1: Outcome Variables and Corresponding Survey Questions 
 




Abnormal BMI (1) Being underweight (BMI<18.5) or overweight (BMI>25), based on current height and weight. 
Chronic (2) During the past six months, have you had any doctor-diagnosed chronic disease? 
Hospitalized (3)  Were you hospitalized last year due to illness/injury? 






on a scale of 
1 to 5) 
Forgetful (1) Are you able to remember the important things that have happened to you within a week? (1-all; 5-a little bit) 
Depressed (2) How often have you felt depressed and could not cheer up in the past month? (1-never; 5-almost every day) 
Nervous (3) How often have you felt nervous in the past month?  (1-never; 5-almost every day) 
Restless (4) How often have you felt agitated or upset and could not remain calm in the past month? (1-never; 5-almost every day)                                              
Hopeless (5) How often have you felt hopeless about the future?  (1-never; 5-almost every day)  
Difficult (6) How often have you felt that everything is difficult?  (1-never; 5-almost every day)  
Worthless (7) How often do you think life is meaningless?  (1-never; 5-almost every day) 











Table 3.2: Summary Statistics (1930-1958 Cohorts) 
 
  [1] [2] [3]   [4] [5] [6]   [5] [6] 





Total number of observations   1477    
 
  10333    
 
[1]-[4] 
Variables Mean S.D. # Obs 
 
Mean S.D. # Obs 
 
Diff. s.e. 
Send-down 0.346  0.476  1,477  
 
0.018  0.132  10333  
 
0.328*** (0.012) 
Physical health measures 
        
  Abnormal BMI (1-yes; 0-no) 0.358  0.480  1,477  
 
0.355  0.478  10333  
 
0.004 (0.013) 
Chronic (1-yes; 0-no) 0.240  0.427  1,477  
 
0.227  0.419  10325  
 
0.014 (0.012) 
Hospitalized (1-yes; 0-no) 0.118  0.420  1,477  
 
0.158  0.514  10328  
 
-0.039*** (0.012) 
Uncomfortable (1-yes; 0-no) 0.278  0.448  1,477  
 
0.349  0.477  10330  
 
-0.070*** (0.013) 
Mental health measures 
        
  Forgetful (1-all; 5-a little bit) 1.990  1.147  1,464  
 
2.834  1.401  10270  
 
-0.844*** (0.033) 
Depressed (1-never; 5- almost every day) 1.521  0.873  1,466  
 
1.741  1.004  10232  
 
-0.220*** (0.025) 
Nervous (1-never; 5- almost every day) 1.366  0.767  1,467  
 
1.576  0.893  10261  
 
-0.210*** (0.022) 
Restless (1-never; 5- almost every day) 1.301  0.706  1,466  
 
1.603  0.924  10260  
 
-0.302*** (0.021) 
Hopeless (1-never; 5- almost every day) 1.279  0.723  1,464  
 
1.443  0.872  10224  
 
-0.164*** (0.021) 
Difficult (1-never; 5- almost every day) 1.348  0.776  1,468  
 
1.722  1.064  10262  
 
-0.374*** (0.023) 
Worthless (1-never; 5- almost every day) 1.244  0.663  1,466  
 
1.416  0.849  10238  
 
-0.172*** (0.019) 
           Other variables: 
        
  Education (years) 10.020  3.361  1,469  
 
3.213  4.156  10333  
 
6.807*** (0.097) 
Total income (1000 yuan) 13.448  30.443  1,477  
 












                    -never married 0.007  0.082  10  
 
0.011  0.104  114  
 
-0.004* (0.002) 
                    -married 0.884  0.320  1,306  
 
0.843  0.363  8712  
 
0.041*** (0.009) 
                    -cohabitating 0.002  0.045  3  
 
0.001  0.033  11  
 
0.001 (0.001) 
                    -divorced 0.040  0.196  59  
 
0.008  0.088  80  
 
0.032*** (0.005) 
                    -widowed 0.067  0.250  99  
 
0.137  0.344  1412  
 
-0.070*** (0.007) 
Age at marriage 25.536  4.113  1,421  
 
22.129  4.487  9186  
 
3.406*** (0.119) 
Age at birth 27.576  4.087  1,416  
 
24.752  4.623  10087  
 
2.825*** (0.118) 
No. of children 1.539  1.063  1,477  
 
2.746  1.402  10333  
 
-1.207*** (0.031) 
Family background during Cultural Revolution: 
 
1,469  
   
10282  
 
                      -revolutionary class 0.699  0.459  1,025  
 
0.717  0.450  7375  
 
-0.018 (0.013) 
                    -middle class 0.205  0.404  301  
 
0.219  0.414  2251  
 
-0.014 (0.011) 
                    -class enemies 0.063  0.243  92  
 
0.058  0.235  601  
 
0.004 (0.007) 
                    -others 0.033  0.178  48  
 
0.005  0.073  55  
 
0.027*** (0.005) 
           Birth weight (k.g.) 3032.9  559.89  434  
 
2833.3  571.85  1872  
 
199.6*** (29.933) 
Number of siblings 3.295  1.961  1,425  
 
3.425  2.008  10177  
 
-0.129** (0.056) 
Gender (male=1) 0.508  0.500  1,477  
 
0.502  0.500  10333  
 
0.006 (0.014) 
Ethnic minority 0.043  0.202  1,477  
 
0.075  0.264  10304  
 
-0.033*** (0.006) 
Father's education (years) 5.334  5.056  196  
 
2.338  3.664  798  
 
2.996*** (0.383) 
Mother's education (years) 2.413  3.983  363  
 
0.48  1.812  1677  
 
1.934*** (0.213) 
Father's age at first birth 30.305  7.521  940  
 
29.897  8.00  5815  
 
0.409 (0.267) 
Mother's age at first birth 27.095  6.610  981  
 
27.226  7.141  5832  
 
-0.131 (0.231) 
Weeks separated from father during 0-12 25.418  87.455  1,419  
 
27.012  94.211  9816  
 
-1.594 (2.508) 
Weeks separated from mother during 0-12 11.710  60.313  1,444  
 
15.959  72.860  9979  
 
-4.249** (1.746) 
Had ever migrated during age 0-12 0.913  0.281  1,467    0.986  0.117  10290    -0.073*** (0.007) 
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Table 3.3: Mean Comparison for Other Covariates 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 
 Had Urban Hukou at Age 12 
 
1940-1946 Cohorts 1947-1953 Cohorts 
 
Ho: diff=0 
Outcome Mean S.D. # Obs Mean S.D. # Obs Difference P-value 
Family background during Cultural Revolution: 
       
                    -revolutionary class 0.680  0.468  203  0.691  0.463  492  -0.011  0.771  
                    -middle class 0.187  0.391  203  0.215  0.412  492  -0.028  0.404  
                    -class enemies 0.089  0.285  203  0.067  0.250  492  0.022  0.321  
                    -other classes 0.044  0.206  203  0.026  0.161  492  0.018  0.221  
         
Number of siblings 3.507  2.166  201  3.475  1.948  476  0.033  0.847  
Gender (male=1) 0.541  0.499  205  0.494  0.500  496  0.048  0.253  
Ethnic minority 0.059  0.235  205  0.046  0.210  496  0.012  0.502  
Had low birth weight 0.058  0.235  52  0.073  0.262  150  -0.016  0.704  
Father's education (years) 6.750  4.743  8  5.754  5.150  65  0.996  0.605  
Mother's education (years) 1.773  3.023  22  2.372  4.064  125  -0.599  0.511  
Father's age at first birth 30.220  8.036  132  30.489  7.892  309  -0.269  0.745  
Mother's age at first birth 26.635  6.612  126  27.367  7.174  330  -0.732  0.320  
Weeks separated from father during age 0-12 22.914  69.792  198  20.123  81.030  479  2.791  0.672  
Weeks separated from mother during age 0-12 13.856  63.203  201  8.057  49.790  487  5.798  0.201  
Had ever migrated during age 0-12 0.936  0.246  202  0.915  0.279  495  0.020  0.363  
Notes: 1.Data include 1940-1953 cohorts who had urban Hukou status at age 12; 
2. Urban observations with below junior high school education levels are excluded from the sample. 
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Table 3.4: First Stage Results 
 
          
 
Function of  Flexible  First Stage 
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial   Send-down 
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No I(cohort>=1947) 0.257*** 
    
(0.080) 
             11,810 
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes I(cohort>=1947) 0.242*** 
    
(0.088) 
             11,810 
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No I(cohort>=1947) 0.203** 
    
(0.096) 
             6,347 
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes I(cohort>=1947) 0.224** 
    
(0.093) 
             6,347 
 
Notes: 1. All regressions are clustered by cohort levels; see Lee and Card (2008); 




Table 3.5: Effects on Physical Health 
 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
Function of  Flexible  Physical Health Measures 
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial Abnormal BMI Chronic Hospitalized Uncomfortable AES 
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No 0.000 0.448** 0.070 -0.283 0.123 
   
(0.210) (0.208) (0.141) (0.202) (0.252) 
              11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes 0.014 0.488** -0.001 -0.389 0.057 
   
(0.269) (0.196) (0.229) (0.282) (0.359) 
              11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No 0.180 0.802*** 0.373 -0.223 0.693 
   
(0.497) (0.305) (0.234) (0.286) (0.495) 
              6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes 0.159 0.724*** 0.342 -0.210 0.625 
   
(0.382) (0.247) (0.209) (0.228) (0.524) 
              6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 
 
Notes: 1. All regressions are clustered by cohort levels; see Lee and Card (2008); 




Table 3.6: Effects on Mental Health 
 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 
Function of  Flexible  Mental Health Measures 
Regression 
Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial Forgetful Depressed Nervous Restless Hopeless Difficult Worthless AES  
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No 1.324* 0.578 0.649** 0.252 0.706 0.818* 0.492 0.908** 
   
(0.780) (0.390) (0.269) (0.332) (0.525) (0.426) (0.490) (0.381) 
                 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes 1.724** 0.933* 0.956** 0.551 1.103 1.058** 0.646 1.337*** 
   
(0.800) (0.508) (0.422) (0.391) (0.734) (0.521) (0.549) (0.459) 
                 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No 2.020* 1.472** 1.177* 0.884 1.601* 1.076* 1.128 1.871*** 
   
(1.069) (0.667) (0.710) (0.729) (0.944) (0.628) (0.751) (0.560) 
                 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes 1.778** 1.474*** 1.177* 0.900 1.505* 0.977* 1.043* 1.801*** 
   
(0.725) (0.554) (0.690) (0.693) (0.807) (0.509) (0.605) (0.505) 
                 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 
 
Notes: 1. All regressions are clustered by cohort levels; see Lee and Card (2008); 
2. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.7a: Control for Predetermined Characteristics 
 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
Function of  Flexible  Physical Health Measures 
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial Abnormal BMI Chronic Hospitalized Uncomfortable AES 
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No -0.082 0.387* 0.083 -0.300 0.043 
   
(0.184) (0.201) (0.131) (0.205) (0.221) 
              11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes -0.089 0.386** -0.005 -0.430 -0.078 
   
(0.219) (0.186) (0.193) (0.292) (0.313) 
              11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No 0.045 0.741** 0.330 -0.294 0.515 
   
(0.638) (0.318) (0.353) (0.330) (0.629) 
              6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes 0.030 0.651** 0.299 -0.272 0.448 
   
(0.448) (0.268) (0.310) (0.255) (0.504) 
              6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 
 
Notes: 1. All regressions are clustered by cohort levels; see Lee and Card (2008); 
2. Predetermined controls include family background during Cultural Revolution, no. of siblings, gender, and race; 
3. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.7b: Control for Predetermined Characteristics (Cont.) 
 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 
Function of  Flexible  Mental Health Measures 
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial Forgetful Depressed Nervous Restless Hopeless Difficult Worthless AES  
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No 1.374* 0.583 0.614** 0.172 0.665 0.732* 0.457 0.852** 
   
(0.799) (0.421) (0.293) (0.314) (0.511) (0.415) (0.437) (0.400) 
                 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes 1.799* 0.914* 0.862** 0.443 0.996 0.882* 0.619 1.242*** 
   
(0.919) (0.519) (0.410) (0.357) (0.701) (0.499) (0.516) (0.482) 
                 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No 2.175* 1.346 1.098 0.789 1.494 0.908* 1.122 1.787*** 
   
(1.126) (0.879) (0.677) (0.792) (0.987) (0.539) (0.775) (0.547) 
                 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes 1.929*** 1.370** 1.093* 0.818 1.403 0.797* 1.050* 1.732*** 
   
(0.739) (0.668) (0.633) (0.704) (0.859) (0.418) (0.629) (0.502) 
                 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 
 
Notes: 1. All regressions are clustered by cohort levels; see Lee and Card (2008); 
2. Predetermined controls include family background during Cultural Revolution, no. of siblings, gender, and race; 
3. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.8a: Placebo Test 
 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
Function of  Flexible  Physical Health Measures 
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial Abnormal BMI Chronic Hospitalized Uncomfortable AES 
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No -0.207 -0.096 0.075 -0.059 -0.158 
   
(0.156) (0.066) (0.111) (0.068) (0.111) 
              11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes -0.234 -0.123 0.046 -0.067 -0.204 
   
(0.188) (0.079) (0.135) (0.084) (0.144) 
              11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No -0.125 -0.086 -0.035 -0.091 -0.183 
   
(0.111) (0.099) (0.204) (0.066) (0.140) 
              6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes -0.103 -0.103 -0.032 -0.094 -0.181 
   
(0.126) (0.103) (0.234) (0.078) (0.177) 
              6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 
 
Notes: 1. All regressions are clustered by cohort levels; see Lee and Card (2008); 




Table 3.8 b: Placebo Test (Cont.) 
 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 
Function of  Flexible  Mental Health Measures 
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial Forgetful Depressed Nervous Restless Hopeless Difficult Worthless AES  
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No 0.331 0.069 0.009 -0.004 0.057 0.139 0.060 0.092 
   
(0.255) (0.185) (0.238) (0.144) (0.120) (0.259) (0.155) (0.146) 
                 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes 0.344 0.027 0.065 0.017 0.144 0.272 0.105 0.143 
   
(0.352) (0.308) (0.284) (0.165) (0.135) (0.282) (0.184) (0.169) 
                 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 11,810 
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No 0.316 -0.127 -0.087 -0.121 -0.004 0.094 -0.051 -0.033 
   
(0.302) (0.259) (0.238) (0.159) (0.148) (0.275) (0.222) (0.178) 
                 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes 0.297 -0.127 -0.101 -0.133 0.004 0.105 -0.044 -0.036 
   
(0.300) (0.285) (0.295) (0.192) (0.173) (0.271) (0.250) (0.201) 
                 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 
 
Notes: 1. All regressions are clustered by cohort levels, see Lee and Card (2008); 




Table 3.9a: Test for Cultural Revolution Effect 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
Function of  Flexible  Physical Health Measures 
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial Abnormal BMI Chronic Hospitalized Uncomfortable AES 
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No -0.039 0.566 0.244 -0.307 0.233 
Fierce violence 
  
(0.414) (0.501) (0.424) (0.339) (0.632) 
   
7,107 7,107 7,107 7,107 7,107 
        1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No 0.321 0.239 -0.379 -0.467 -0.172 
Fewer violence 
  
(0.490) (0.270) (0.392) (0.541) (0.623) 
   
4,703 4,703 4,703 4,703 4,703 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
       χ2 
  
0.424 0.397 1.224 0.0814 
 Prob. > χ2     0.515 0.529 0.269 0.775   
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes 0.044 0.518 0.038 -0.444 0.071 
Fierce violence 
  
(0.502) (0.444) (0.452) (0.483) (0.611) 
   
7,107 7,107 7,107 7,107 7,107 
        1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes 0.248 0.311 -0.318 -0.537 -0.169 
Fewer violence 
  
(0.533) (0.462) (0.474) (0.624) (0.602) 
   
4,703 4,703 4,703 4,703 4,703 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
       χ2 
  
0.139  0.213  0.320  0.018  
 Prob. > χ2     0.709  0.645  0.571  0.894    
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      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
Function of  Flexible  Physical Health Measures 
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial Abnormal BMI Chronic Hospitalized Uncomfortable AES 
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No 0.374 0.987** 0.617 -0.022 1.215 
Fierce violence 
  
(0.708) (0.481) (0.478) (0.422) (0.863) 
   
3,843 3,843 3,843 3,843 3,843 
     
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No 0.076 0.382 -0.051 -0.813 -0.168 
Fewer violence 
  
(32.517) (3.165) (26.954) (10.479) (24.035) 
   
2,504 2,504 2,504 2,504 2,504 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
       χ2 
  
0.168 1.039 0.981 1.177 
 Prob. > χ2 
  
0.682 0.308 0.322 0.278   
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes 0.302 0.866** 0.537 -0.038 1.040* 
Fierce violence 
  
(0.525) (0.382) (0.361) (0.354) (0.591) 
   
3,843 3,843 3,843 3,843 3,843 
        
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes 0.124 0.397 -0.006 -0.799 -0.098 
Fewer violence 
  
(0.741) (0.514) (0.704) (0.910) (0.836) 
   
6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 6,347 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
       χ2 
  
0.073 0.678 0.821 1.419 
 Prob. > χ2     0.787 0.41 0.365 0.234   
Notes: 1. Violent provinces include Beijing, Shanghai, Shaanxi, Zhejiang, Chongqing, Hubei, Hunan, Tianjin, Heilongjiang, Hebei, Shandong, Guizhou, 
Liaoning, Anhui, Qinghai, and Henan 
2. All regressions are clustered by cohort levels; see Lee and Card (2008). Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.9b: Test for Cultural Revolution Effect (Cont.) 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 
Function of  Flexible  Mental Health Measures 
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial Forgetful Depressed Nervous Restless Hopeless Difficult Worthless AES  
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No 0.578 0.297 0.625 0.222 0.586 0.614 0.446 0.964 
Fierce violence 
  
(1.103) (0.587) (0.459) (0.376) (0.699) (0.709) (0.398) (0.609) 
           
   
7,107 7,107 7,107 7,107 7,107 7,107 7,107 7,107 
           
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No 2.654** 0.753 0.607 0.147 0.981 0.780 0.479 0.871 
Fewer violence 
  
(1.215) (0.735) (0.478) (0.740) (0.931) (1.051) (0.846) (0.632) 
           
   
4,703 4,703 4,703 4,703 4,703 4,703 4,703 4,703 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
          χ2 
  
6.677  0.395  0.001  0.011  0.166  0.020  0.003  
 Prob. > χ2     0.010  0.530  0.977  0.916  0.684  0.888  0.960    
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes 0.933 0.506 0.878 0.446 1.090 0.665 0.516 1.355** 
Fierce violence 
  
(0.891) (0.804) (0.642) (0.513) (0.871) (0.680) (0.545) (0.586) 
           
   
7,107 7,107 7,107 7,107 7,107 7,107 7,107 7,107 
           
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes 2.942 1.133 0.942 0.477 1.183 1.046 0.703 1.228 
Fewer violence 
  
(1.958) (0.881) (0.840) (0.741) (1.016) (1.368) (0.949) (0.860) 
           
   
4,703 4,703 4,703 4,703 4,703 4,703 4,703 4,703 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
          χ2 
  
4.841  0.669  0.009  0.002  0.011  0.151  0.091  




      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 
Function of  Flexible  Mental Health Measures 
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial Forgetful Depressed Nervous Restless Hopeless Difficult Worthless AES  
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No 1.179 1.127 0.889 0.685 1.504* 1.077* 0.831* 1.818*** 
Fierce violence 
  
(1.136) (0.964) (0.854) (0.944) (0.808) (0.617) (0.505) (0.640) 
   
3,843 3,843 3,843 3,843 3,843 3,843 3,843 3,843 
           
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No 3.296 1.315 1.295 0.644 1.627 0.507 1.171 1.574 
Fewer violence 
  
(93.385) (2.149) (29.131) (8.218) (6.026) (98.795) (39.267) (52.895) 
   
2,504 2,504 2,504 2,504 2,504 2,504 2,504 2,504 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
          χ2 
  
3.625  0.052  0.189  0.002  0.012  0.224  0.221  
 Prob. > χ2     0.057  0.820  0.664  0.960  0.911  0.636  0.638    
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes 0.929 1.099* 0.925 0.654 1.332** 0.913** 0.722* 1.675*** 
Fierce violence 
  
(0.758) (0.667) (0.760) (0.817) (0.648) (0.385) (0.410) (0.463) 
   
3,843 3,843 3,843 3,843 3,843 3,843 3,843 3,843 
           
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes 3.184* 1.519 1.365 0.804 1.778 0.638 1.247 1.746 
Fewer violence 
  
(1.888) (2.071) (1.584) (0.931) (1.517) (3.490) (1.438) (1.286) 
   
2,504 2,504 2,504 2,504 2,504 2,504 2,504 2,504 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
          χ2 
  
4.378  0.207  0.235  0.045  0.191  0.074  0.584  
 Prob. > χ2     0.036  0.649  0.628  0.833  0.662  0.785  0.445    
Notes: 1. Violent provinces include Beijing, Shanghai, Shaanxi, Zhejiang, Chongqing, Hubei, Hunan, Tianjin, Heilongjiang, Hebei, Shandong, Guizhou, 
Liaoning, Anhui, Qinghai, and Henan 
2. All regressions are clustered by cohort levels; see Lee and Card (2008). Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.10: Post-send-down Outcomes 
 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
   
Post-send-down Outcomes 
 
Function of  Flexible  Schooling  Total Being Being Age at Age at No. of  
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial years income  single divorce  marriage  birth children 
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No -1.819 15.121 0.041 0.153 -0.578 2.641 0.711 
   
(1.947) (20.747) (0.043) (0.101) (3.241) (2.100) (0.688) 
                11,802 11,810 11,806 11,806 10,607 11,503 11,810 
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes -2.945 16.275 0.038 0.206** -1.239 2.567 0.985 
   
(2.493) (15.190) (0.052) (0.101) (3.980) (3.462) (1.004) 
                11,802 11,810 11,806 11,806 10,607 11,503 11,810 
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No -4.714 15.752 0.026 0.166 0.437 4.433 0.546 
   
(3.477) (25.862) (0.073) (0.169) (3.993) (3.884) (1.032) 
                6,342 6,347 6,345 6,345 5,712 6,188 6,347 
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes -4.600 -2.114 0.031 0.157 0.298 3.844 0.423 
   
(3.069) (2.040) (0.062) (0.133) (2.892) (3.562) (0.814) 
                6,342 6,347 6,345 6,345 5,712 6,188 6,347 
Notes: 1. All regressions are clustered by cohort levels; see Lee and Card (2008); 
2. Income is in thousand yuan; 
3. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.11a: Heterogeneous Effects by Gender 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
Function of  Flexible  Physical Health Measures 
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial Abnormal BMI Chronic Hospitalized Uncomfortable AES 
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No 0.077 -0.221 -0.280 -0.649* -0.623 
Males 
  
(0.353) (0.348) (0.497) (0.334) (0.450) 
        
   
5,936 5,936 5,936 5,936 5,936 
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No -0.055 0.971* 0.340 -0.009 0.637 
Females 
  
(0.357) (0.550) (0.452) (0.367) (0.524) 
        
   
5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
       χ2 
  
0.092  3.706  0.736  2.125  
 Prob. > χ2     0.762  0.054  0.391  0.145    
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes 0.038 -0.420 -0.506 -0.861 -1.017* 
Males 
  
(0.479) (0.559) (0.681) (0.535) (0.601) 
        
   
5,936 5,936 5,936 5,936 5,936 
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes 0.046 1.170** 0.347 -0.057 0.770 
Females 
  
(0.277) (0.468) (0.368) (0.425) (0.510) 
        
   
5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
       χ2 
  
0.000  5.551  1.483  2.427  




Table 3.11a: Heterogeneous Effects by Gender (Cont.) 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
Function of  Flexible  Physical Health Measures 
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial Abnormal BMI Chronic Hospitalized Uncomfortable AES 
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No 0.185 -0.249 -0.249 -0.516 -0.566 
Males 
  
(9.769) (9.744) (18.033) (5.757) (8.790) 
        
   
3,233 3,233 3,233 3,233 3,233 
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No 0.148 1.415* 0.723 -0.078 1.277 
Females 
  
(0.510) (0.833) (1.153) (0.701) (1.171) 
        
   
3,114 3,114 3,114 3,114 3,114 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 




0.010  3.461  0.808  0.533  
 Prob. > χ2     0.921  0.063  0.369  0.465    
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes 0.073 -0.265 -0.212 -0.433 -0.559 
Males 
  
(1.882) (2.151) (3.551) (1.234) (1.714) 
        
   
3,233 3,233 3,233 3,233 3,233 
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes 0.194 1.288** 0.642 -0.117 1.162* 
Females 
  
(0.345) (0.525) (0.477) (0.483) (0.618) 
        
   
3,114 3,114 3,114 3,114 3,114 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
       χ2 
  
0.159 4.47 0.971 0.333 
 Prob. > χ2     0.69 0.0345 0.324 0.564   
Notes: 1. All regressions are clustered by cohort levels; see Lee and Card (2008); 
2. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.11b: Heterogeneous Effects by Gender (Cont.) 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 
Function of  Flexible  Mental Health Measures 
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial Forgetful Depressed Nervous Restless Hopeless Difficult Worthless AES  
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No 0.621 0.880 1.116*** 0.412 0.576 0.683 0.522 0.774 
Males 
  
(0.961) (0.731) (0.363) (0.601) (0.784) (0.837) (0.690) (0.675) 
           
   
5,936 5,936 5,936 5,936 5,936 5,936 5,936 5,936 
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No 1.849 0.256 0.182 0.096 0.776 0.918 0.517 1.003 
Females 
  
(1.480) (0.543) (0.690) (0.526) (0.556) (0.720) (0.480) (0.735) 
           
   
5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
          χ2 
  
0.787 0.666 1.478 0.246 0.123  0.070  0.000  
 Prob. > χ2     0.375 0.414 0.224 0.620 0.726  0.791  0.994    
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes 0.904 1.101 1.459** 0.572 0.923 0.894 0.706 1.072 
Males 
  
(1.383) (0.997) (0.700) (1.039) (1.362) (1.209) (1.161) (1.036) 
           
   
5,936 5,936 5,936 5,936 5,936 5,936 5,936 5,936 
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes 2.309** 0.750 0.564 0.579 1.240* 1.191* 0.651 1.546*** 
Females 
  
(1.020) (0.647) (0.808) (0.658) (0.702) (0.703) (0.450) (0.594) 
           
   
5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 5,874 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
          χ2 
  
0.858 0.197 0.884 0.000  0.194  0.067  0.005  




Table 3.11b: Heterogeneous Effects by Gender (Cont.) 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [5] [5] [5] 
 
Function of  Flexible  Mental Health Measures 
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial Forgetful Depressed Nervous Restless AES  Difficult Worthless AES  
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No 0.790 1.315 1.389 0.740 1.536 1.027 1.370 1.442 
Males 
  
(10.236) (5.688) (13.645) (14.017) (33.183) (28.454) (25.312) (12.957) 
           
   
3,233 3,233 3,233 3,233 3,233 5,936 5,936 5,936 
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic No 2.642 1.226 0.744 0.853 1.534 1.155 0.970 2.077** 
Females 
  
(1.767) (1.777) (1.235) (1.317) (1.266) (1.022) (0.949) (0.999) 
           
   
3,114 3,114 3,114 3,114 3,114 5,874 5,874 5,874 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
  
     
   χ2 
  
1.404  0.009  0.321  0.011  0.000  0.009  0.235  
 Prob. > χ2     0.236  0.923  0.571  0.917  0.998  0.926  0.628    
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes 0.695 1.439 1.381 0.848 1.538 0.894 0.706 1.072 
Males 
  
(2.174) (1.491) (2.765) (2.844) (1.525) (1.209) (1.161) (1.036) 
           
   
3,233 3,233 3,233 3,233 3,233 5,936 5,936 5,936 
1930-1958 cohorts Linear Yes 2.276** 1.159 0.763 0.800 1.308 1.191* 0.651 1.546*** 
Females 
  
(1.119) (1.259) (1.123) (1.131) (0.899) (0.703) (0.450) (0.594) 
           
   
3,114 3,114 3,114 3,114 3,114 5,874 5,874 5,874 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
          χ2 
  
1.242 0.114 0.297 0.002  0.042  0.000  0.433  
 Prob. > χ2     0.265 0.735 0.586 0.962 0.838 0.996 0.511   
Notes: 1. All regressions are clustered by cohort levels; see Lee and Card (2008); 
2. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.12a: Heterogeneous Effects by No. of Siblings 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
Function of  Flexible  Physical Health Measures 
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial Abnormal BMI Chronic Hospitalized Uncomfortable AES 
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No -0.292 0.144 0.147 -0.548 -0.311 
More siblings 
  
(0.398) (0.169) (0.206) (0.357) (0.349) 
        
   
7,914 7,914 7,914 7,914 7,914 
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No 0.613 1.294 0.017 0.285 1.323 
Fewer siblings 
  
(1.290) (1.129) (0.842) (0.613) (1.451) 
        
   
3,896 3,896 3,896 3,896 3,896 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
       χ2 
  
1.213 3.811 0.0488 6.902 
 Prob. > χ2     0.271 0.051 0.825 0.009   
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes -0.212 0.178 0.103 -0.628 -0.315 
More siblings 
  
(0.288) (0.236) (0.247) (0.384) (0.398) 
        
   
7,914 7,914 7,914 7,914 7,914 
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes 0.585 1.508 -0.127 0.185 1.304 
Fewer siblings 
  
(5.121) (5.091) (1.100) (3.412) (7.628) 
        
   
3,896 3,896 3,896 3,896 3,896 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
       χ2 
  
1.037 4.003 0.128 3.729 




Table 3.12a: Heterogeneous Effects by No. of Siblings (Cont.) 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
Function of  Flexible  Physical Health Measures 
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial Abnormal BMI Chronic Hospitalized Uncomfortable AES 
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No -0.096 0.364 0.344 -0.387 0.137 
More siblings 
  
(0.531) (0.382) (0.220) (0.403) -0.508 
        
   
4,272 4,272 4,272 4,272 4,272 
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No 0.882 2.092 0.417 0.135 2.548 
Fewer siblings 
  
(4.662) (3.924) (1.697) (1.122) (6.565) 
        
   
2,075 2,075 2,075 2,075 2,075 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 




0.751 3.566 0.009 2.361 
 Prob. > χ2     0.386 0.059 0.927 0.124   
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes -0.049 0.355 0.301* -0.364 0.147 
More siblings 
  
(0.401) (0.307) (0.171) (0.305) (0.353) 
        
   
4,272 4,272 4,272 4,272 4,272 
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes 0.650 1.824 0.441 0.134 2.253 
Fewer siblings 
  
(8.365) (7.835) (1.306) (3.624) (12.025) 
        
   
2,075 2,075 2,075 2,075 2,075 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
       χ2 
  
5.684 0.0426 2.318 1.852 
 Prob. > χ2     0.0171 0.836 0.128 0.174   
Notes: 1. All regressions are clustered by cohort levels; see Lee and Card (2008); 
2. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.12 b: Heterogeneous Effects by No. of Siblings (Cont.) 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 
Function of  Flexible  Mental Health Measures 
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial Forgetful Depressed Nervous Restless Hopeless Difficult Worthless AES  
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No 0.556 -0.164 0.210 -0.204 0.336 0.650 0.486 0.468 
More siblings 
  
(0.973) (0.690) (0.302) (0.359) (0.483) (0.519) (0.629) (0.413) 
           
   
7,914 7,914 7,914 7,914 7,914 7,914 7,914 7,914 
1930-1958 cohorts Cubic No 3.219 2.272 1.659* 1.215 1.577 1.045 0.452 1.843 
Fewer siblings 
  
(3.005) (2.065) (0.860) (1.313) (1.851) (1.244) (1.147) (1.946) 
           
   
3,896 3,896 3,896 3,896 3,896 3,896 3,896 3,896 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
          χ2 
  
3.454 6.635 4.927 2.908 4.824 0.194 0.003 
 Prob. > χ2     0.063 0.010 0.026 0.088 0.028 0.660 0.953   
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes 0.686 -0.035 0.392 -0.127 0.601 0.892 0.526 0.685 
More siblings 
  
(0.851) (0.781) (0.457) (0.459) (0.706) (0.594) (0.676) (0.578) 
           
   
7,914 7,914 7,914 7,914 7,914 7,914 7,914 7,914 
1930-1958 cohorts Quadratic Yes 5.010 3.684 2.499 2.367 2.594 1.343 1.053 3.216 
Fewer siblings 
  
(23.327) (13.852) (3.996) (7.746) (11.806) (6.134) (5.220) (15.738) 
           
   
3,896 3,896 3,896 3,896 3,896 3,896 3,896 3,896 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
          χ2 
  
2.965 5.637 5.525 6.339 3.523 0.184 0.334 




      [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 
Function of  Flexible  Mental Health Measures 
Regression Specification Adjusted Cohort Polynomial Forgetful Depressed Nervous Restless Hopeless Difficult Worthless AES  
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No 1.207 0.617 0.644 0.206 0.905 1.214 0.816 1.234** 
More siblings 
  
(1.122) (0.847) (0.602) (0.753) (0.713) (0.786) (0.667) (0.595) 
           
   
4,272 4,272 4,272 4,272 4,272 4,272 4,272 4,272 
1940-1953 cohorts Quadratic No 4.334 4.190 2.819 3.134 3.996 0.459 2.416 4.028 
Fewer siblings 
  
(8.583) (5.772) (2.537) (2.698) (5.007) (3.185) (3.088) (3.956) 
           
   
2,075 2,075 2,075 2,075 2,075 2,075 2,075 2,075 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
  
        
χ2 
  
1.656 3.824 3.480 7.989 4.336 0.465 1.886 
 Prob. > χ2     0.198 0.051 0.062 0.005 0.0373 0.495 0.170   
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes 1.053 0.634 0.662 0.220 0.862 1.075** 0.752 1.172** 
More siblings 
  
(0.827) (0.608) (0.576) (0.656) (0.621) (0.538) (0.541) (0.515) 
           
   
4,272 4,272 4,272 4,272 4,272 4,272 4,272 4,272 
1940-1953 cohorts Linear Yes 4.024 4.256 2.814 3.230 3.841 0.563 2.361 4.097 
Fewer siblings 
  
(25.478) (24.367) (10.067) (13.427) (21.572) (4.620) (14.700) (20.129) 
           
   
2,075 2,075 2,075 2,075 2,075 2,075 2,075 2,075 
Test Ho: ß1=ß2 
          χ2 
  
4.458 3.273 3.273 8.368 4.701 0.331 2.356 
 Prob. > χ2     0.035 0.070 0.070 0.004 0.030 0.565 0.125   
 
Notes: 1. All regressions are clustered by cohort levels; see Lee and Card (2008); 
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